Singapore Democratic Party’s (SDP) Chee Soon Juan has made a questionable choice nominating Ariffin Sha, the 27-year-old founder of Wake Up, Singapore (WUSG), to contest Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC.

The decision is not a minor oversight—it points to a lapse in judgment that may cast doubts on Chee’s fitness for ministerial office.

While the People’s Action Party (PAP) has faced its own scandals involving individuals who were later convicted (Eg. Iswaran), these typically emerge after elections, not before.

Background

In August 2024, Ariffin was fined S$8,000 after pleading guilty to criminal defamation for publishing a fabricated story about KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital, falsely claiming a woman suffered a miscarriage due to negligence.

Chee’s response to Ariffin's red flag is has been evasive.

At a press conference on April 13, 2025, he urged voters to focus on SDP’s policies, not Ariffin’s past, and compared the case to former PAP Speaker Tan Chuan-Jin’s resignation over an extramarital affair. The comparison misses the mark: Tan’s personal lapse, while serious, did not involve lawbreaking or public harm.

Chee’s deflection sidesteps the core issue of vetting a candidate with a known conviction.

Leadership requires sound judgement

The PAP is not immune to scrutiny.

Cases like former Transport Minister S. Iswaran’s corruption charges in January 2024 and former Tampines GRC MP Cheng Li Hui’s affair with Speaker of Parliament Tan Chuan Jin reveal vetting gaps.

However, these issues emerged after elections. The PAP acted decisively, removing Iswaran from his post and asked both Tan Chuan Jin and Cheng Li Hui to resign.

No system guarantees flawless candidates, but knowingly selecting a convict pre-election reflects a clearer lapse in judgment.

Zero tolerance on misinformation

Ariffin’s case strikes at Singapore’s zero-tolerance stance on misinformation.

In 2024, POFMA was invoked 15 times to correct falsehoods, underscoring the harm of unchecked narratives. Ariffin’s defamation directly contravened this ethos, making his nomination a liability in a constituency where community cohesion is vital.

Residents value reliability in governance. Chee’s oversight suggests a disconnect, potentially eroding confidence in SDP’s ability to address bread-and-butter issues like job security and affordability.

Ariffin’s supporters may cite his work with Wake Up, Singapore, which amplifies marginalized voices, or argue his youth mitigates his error. These arguments carry limited weight.

Public office demands high standards, especially in Singapore, where trust underpins stability.

Ariffin’s conviction reflects a lapse in responsibility, and Chee’s endorsement suggests inadequate scrutiny.

新加坡能否在动荡的地缘政治格局中保持中立？

前贸易及工业部长、现任教育部长陈振声在新传媒播客中指出，问题不在于选择站队——有时这由不得你——而在于让新加坡变得如此不可或缺，以至于各方都想分一杯羹。

陈部长的洞见凸显了新加坡务实的外交策略，但却掩盖了一个冷峻的事实：在中美之间深厚的经济与战略纠葛面前，中立不过是一场海市蜃楼。

中立承诺公正，但新加坡的现实与之背道而驰

由于与美国和中国的经济、战略及地缘政治联系根深蒂固，新加坡在中美贸易战中无法保持真正中立。

2023年，中国占新加坡出口的14%（830亿美元），进口的13%；美国则占出口的13%（760亿美元），进口的10%。

美国的外国直接投资（2340亿美元）是新加坡经济增长的引擎，而中国的“一带一路”倡议则充分利用新加坡港口的枢纽地位，2024年处理了3700万标准箱（TEU）。

新加坡支持美国主导的印太框架，如2022年启动的“印太经济繁荣框架”（IPEF）。这一由14国（不含中国）组成的联盟，旨在促进贸易与供应链韧性。

被排除在IPEF之外的中国，将其视为美国遏制其地区影响力的棋局。中国外交部长王毅痛斥这是经济“脱钩”与“煽动对抗”的企图。

2024年，中国官媒点名批评新加坡在IPEF中的角色，暗示可能招致贸易报复，至今虽未见实质行动，但信号清晰：当最大贸易伙伴感到被背叛，中立不过是镜花水月。

在东盟走钢丝：平衡大国与区域挑战

在安全领域，新加坡依赖美国，尤其是在动荡地区维持威慑力量，这使其战略天平有所倾斜。

真正的中立要求疏远与美国的防务合作，但面对区域威胁——包括中国在南海对东盟的强硬姿态——这一选项几无可能。

尽管新加坡在南海没有主权声索，但其支持基于规则的国际秩序，暗中配合美国针对中国主张的“航行自由”行动。这一立场在《2024年新加坡外交政策报告》中清晰阐述，引发中国不满，重创其中立形象。

作为东盟核心成员，新加坡致力于区域团结。然而，东盟内部裂痕——柬埔寨与老挝亲近中国，菲律宾与越南倾向美国——使中立成为外交雷区。

新加坡的真正策略：不是中立，而是实力

选择中立意味着在经济与安全上避免与任何一方结盟，但新加坡对中美市场的依赖迫使其采取务实外交。

偏向一方可能疏远另一方，而超然物外则可能使新加坡在全球贸易网络中被边缘化。

因此，新加坡追求“战略自主”——两面下注、多元化伙伴关系、保持最大灵活性。这种策略宛如一辆精密战车，游走于大国博弈之间，而不被任何一方完全吞并。

2023年，新加坡6000亿新元的经济在关税逆风中仍增长1.2%，彰显其非凡韧性。

新加坡的真正优势不在于回避站队，而在于让自己成为不可或缺的枢纽，让大国竞相拉拢。

这不是中立——这是实力。

29,564 voters in Jalan Kayu SMC will likely have to choose between two kayus come May 3, 2025: Ng Chee Meng, the People's Action Party's NTUC chief tainted by the 2024 Allianz-Income debacle, and Kala Manickam, Red Dot United's (RDU) combative educator whose 2021 PSP lawsuit reveals a divisive streak.

Background on Ng Chee Meng and Kala Manickam

Ng Chee Meng, 56, served as Chief of Air Force (2009–2013) and Chief of Defence Force (2013–2015) in the Singapore Armed Forces.

Entering politics with the People’s Action Party (PAP) in 2015, he won Pasir Ris–Punggol GRC but lost Sengkang GRC in 2020 (47.88% votes).

As NTUC Secretary-General since 2018, Ng has championed workforce development and workers' rights. Yet, his endorsement of the 2024 Allianz-Income deal, marred by a S$1.85 billion capital extraction and transparency lapses, paints him as either complicit in prioritizing profits or negligent in oversight.

Kala Manickam, 57, is a relatable yet polarizing opposition candidate, bringing a mix of grassroots appeal and contentious history.

A single mother, specialist educator, and SME owner, she holds a Master’s in Lifelong Learning and was a pioneer female officer in the Singapore Armed Forces, serving seven years as a lieutenant.

Kala's 2020 run in Nee Soon GRC with the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) yielded 38.76% of votes, but her expulsion from PSP in December 2020 led to a 2021 lawsuit alleging wrongful termination. The lawsuit was later settled amicably but revealed a divisive streak through accusations of insubordination and solo campaigning.

Now with Red Dot United (RDU), Kala is the likely candidate for Jalan Kayu SMC, advocating for job retraining and cost-of-living relief.

Ng Chee Meng's NTUC-Allianz controversy

In July 2024, NTUC and Allianz proposed a S$2.2 billion acquisition deal to bolster NTUC Income's competitiveness.

In an August 2024 statement with NTUC President K Thanaletchimi, he endorsed the deal, assuring that Allianz would honor Income’s social mission and existing policies.

But the devil was in the details: a S$1.85 billion capital extraction plan would have seen Allianz recoup nearly half its investment, potentially draining reserves meant to keep premiums low.

The Singapore government, led by Minister Edwin Tong, blocked the deal on October 14, 2024, citing its clash with Income’s 2022 corporatization goal of building financial strength for policyholders.

As NTUC Enterprise board member and NTUC chief, Ng’s claim that the central committee was unaware of the capital extraction plan until disclosure is damning.

Yet, the capital extraction plan—described by former Income CEO Tan Suee Chieh as a “breach of good faith”—contradicted this.

Ng’s claim of acting in “good faith” rings hollow when his dual roles as NTUC leader and NTUC Enterprise board member placed him at the heart of decision-making.

If Ng knew about the extraction and supported it, he’s complicit in prioritizing profits over people.

If he didn’t know, as he claims, he’s guilty of negligence—a damning indictment for a former Chief of Defence Force who built his career on precision and accountability.

SMU’s Eugene Tan called this ignorance “mind-boggling".

This isn’t Ng’s first misstep.

In January 2025, he attributed job insecurity to AI, ignoring netizens’ concerns over foreign manpower policies, alienating workers facing stagnant wages and sparked backlash for misreading ground sentiments..

His 2020 Sengkang GRC loss (47.88% vote share) already marks him as vulnerable.

Ng’s military pedigree and NTUC role are assets, but the Allianz saga reveals a leader either too cozy with corporate interests or too lax to notice their overreach.

His inability to anticipate public outrage—or even know the deal’s terms—undermines his claim to represent workers.

Jalan Kayu’s voters, wary of PAP’s perceived elitism, may question whether Ng prioritizes their needs or the party line. His campaign’s reliance on PAP machinery, despite his “own merits” rhetoric, risks reinforcing this skepticism.

Kala Manickam's PSP controversy

In July 2021, Kala sued PSP in the High Court (later transferred to State Courts), seeking a declaration that her December 2020 termination was “wrongful and invalid” and a S$10,000 refund for election expenses (e.g., fliers, pamphlets).

She argued PSP violated its constitution and due process, claiming she was not informed of specific charges, given no chance to defend herself, and unaware of investigation outcomes.

PSP’s seven affidavits, including from Tan Cheng Bock, painted her as “disruptive” and “insubordinate,” bullying teammates, and undermining cohesion.

Kala's fellow Nee Soon GRC candidate Damien Tay described her as putting her self-interests ahead of the team, during the run-up to the elections. He and candidate Taufik Supan cited how she "went about doing her own things", such as going on solo walkabouts, skipping team meetings and amassing a volunteer pool for herself.

A 17-member petition - including Kala's own election agent - and 55-to-11 cadre vote against her reinstatement bolstered PSP’s case.

Tan Cheng Bock pointed to a November 2020 meeting in where she was confrontational, as if "raring for a fight"; and "aggressively questioned… proof of her wrongdoings by shouting: 'WHAT PROOF? WHAT PROOF?'".

Kala’s public airing of grievances—via Facebook and court—signals a principled stand but also a divisive style.

Her actions suggest a lone-wolf mentality, ill-suited for Singapore’s collaborative politics.

Her move to Red Dot United (RDU), a smaller party, looks opportunistic, especially after RDU chief Ravi Philemon’s own PSP exit.

Kala’s SAF and educator roles show leadership, but her PSP fallout reveals a failure to build alliances.

Ng benefits from PAP’s ground game and Jalan Kayu’s Ang Mo Kio roots, but his Allianz misstep and Sengkang loss make him vulnerable.

Kala’s relatable story and opposition unity give her an edge, but her PSP saga and lesser-known status limit her reach.

The Workers’ Party’s absence (no confirmed candidate) and People's Power Party potential entry could complicate vote splits, though RDU’s coordination mitigates this.

In Jalan Kayu SMC, it's not about picking a winner, but rather, who is the sturdier of two kayus.

With HDB resale prices up 50% since 2020 and BTO waiting times stretching to five years, affordability and access are strangling young couples, singles, and retirees alike.

The 99-year lease model, once a cornerstone of stability, now looms as a ticking time bomb for ageing flats.

The PAP, WP, SDP and PSP have rolled out their housing manifestos, each claiming to fix voters' housing concerns.

But do they deliver?

PAP - more flats, same old tune

Flood the market with supply, tweak eligibilit, and tackle lease decay head-on

The PAP, Singapore’s ruling juggernaut, promises to build over 50,000 new HDB flats in three years—enough for an entire Ang Mo Kio town.

They’re doubling down on Shorter Waiting Time flats to cut BTO delays, exploring options for higher-income couples and singles, and pushing the Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme (VERS) to rejuvenate old estates like Kallang-Whampoa.

More flats don’t automatically mean cheaper flats

The Housing Price Index (HPI) ratio—median flat price to median income—hovers around 5-6, far from affordable for a $80,000-a-year household eyeing a $400,000 4-room BTO.

PAP’s reliance on grants, like the Enhanced CPF Housing Grant, is a band-aid, not a cure, when resale prices have soared 50% in five years.

VERS sounds promising but lacks teeth—its voluntary nature and vague compensation details leave residents guessing, unlike the more decisive Selective En bloc Redevelopment Scheme (SERS).

Expanding access for singles and higher-income groups is inclusive but risks diverting resources from lower-income families who can’t even dream of a $500,000 resale flat.

And while 50,000 flats sound impressive, global supply chain crunches and labor shortages could derail delivery, as seen in past construction delays.

Stability, not affordability

PAP’s plan is feasible, backed by HDB’s machine and approximately $1.2 trillion in reserves, but it’s incremental, not transformative.

PAP is betting on stability, not affordability, leaving young Singaporeans stuck in a cycle of grants and grit.

WP - bold on ideas, shaky on substance

The Workers’ Party takes a different tack, zeroing in on affordability with a promise to slash the HPI ratio to 3.0 or below—meaning a 4-room flat for a median-income family would cost no more than $240,000.

They propose 70-year BTO leases at lower prices, with an option to top up to 99 years, and a universal buy-back scheme to rescue retirees from depreciating flats.

To sweeten the deal, WP wants HDB to reacquire coffee shops and cap rents to inflation, easing living costs in estates.

Gutsy policy proposals but no clarity on how to fund it

WP's proposed housing policies speak directly to middle-class families and retirees crushed by prices.

An HPI of 3.0 would be a game-changer, making homeownership a reality, not a pipe dream.

The 70-year lease option is clever, offering flexibility for cash-strapped buyers, while the buy-back scheme tackles lease decay with precision, ensuring grannies in 40-year-old flats aren’t left penniless.

A very costly proposal

But ambition comes at a cost.

Dropping the HPI to 3.0 means slashing flat prices by 40-50%, requiring massive subsidies or land cost write-offs that could dent fiscal reserves or spike taxes.

The buy-back scheme, while noble, could cost billions if applied universally, and WP’s manifesto is mum on funding.

Worse, there’s no clear plan to boost flat supply, leaving waiting times untouched—a glaring blind spot when young couples are begging for faster BTOs.

WP’s heart is in the right place, but its wallet might not be.

PSP - radical vision, risky bet

The Progress Singapore Party swings for the fences with its Affordable Homes Scheme (AHS), scrapping BTOs to sell flats without land costs—recovered only on resale. This could halve prices, dropping a $400,000 flat to $200,000.

Singles aged 28+ get to buy 2- and 3-room flats anywhere, more flats will be built based on demand, and a Millennial Apartments Scheme offers short-term rentals in prime spots for young folks.

It’s a bold, youth-centric vision, promising to break the affordability curse and free CPF savings for retirement.

Revolutionary if it works, catastrophic if it flops

AHS is a stroke of genius on paper, tackling the root of high prices: land costs, which eat up half a flat’s value.

Letting singles buy at 28 in any estate is a nod to a growing demographic—30% of adults are single—while rental apartments cater to millennials delaying marriage.

But genius comes with glitches.

Deferring land costs guts government revenue ($20 billion yearly from land sales), risking budget shortfalls or reserve dips that Singapore’s fiscal hawks will savage.

Resale markets could tank as cheap new flats flood in, rattling homeowners’ wealth.

AHS demands a complete HDB overhaul, a bureaucratic nightmare to implement.

The Millennial Scheme sounds sexy but faces land scarcity in prime areas, limiting scale.

And PSP’s silence on lease decay is a fatal flaw—retirees with 30 years left on their flats get no lifeline.

It’s a high-stakes gamble: revolutionary if it works, catastrophic if it flops.

SDP - bold but tricky to execute

Slash prices with NOM flats, prioritize families, and secure retirements

The Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) proposes a transformative Non-Open Market (NOM) Scheme, selling HDB flats at cost—excluding land costs—for as low as S$70,000 (2-room) to S$240,000 (5-room).

NOM flats can’t be resold on the open market, only back to HDB, curbing speculation.

The Young Families Priority Scheme (YFPS) fast-tracks flat access for couples with kids, while singles, single parents, and low-income renters get broader eligibility.

An enhanced Lease Buy-Back Scheme offers seniors inflation-adjusted annuities, and a buffer stock of flats aims to slash waiting times.

A sophisticated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) balloting system promises efficient allocation.

Affordability and inclusivity with a side of complexity

SDP’s NOM Scheme is a masterstroke for affordability, potentially cutting a 4-room flat from S$400,000 to S$160,000, freeing CPF savings for retirement and family needs.

YFPS directly tackles Singapore’s dismal 0.78 Total Fertility Rate by prioritizing young families, while inclusive policies for singles and single parents resonate with 30% of adults who are single.

The buffer stock and VCG system could shrink waiting times, addressing a key pain point.

The annuity-based Lease Buy-Back is a lifeline for retirees, ensuring dignity without depleting equity.

Bold but tricky to execute

NOM’s cost-recovery model, while appealing, risks government revenue losses similar to PSP’s AHS, though SDP’s resale restrictions may stabilize markets better.

Converting existing flats to NOM could spark legal or financial disputes over compensation.

The VCG system, while innovative, may confuse applicants unused to bidding premiums, and maintaining a buffer stock demands precise demographic forecasting to avoid oversupply.

Funding grants for low-income households (up to S$60,000) and annuities could strain reserves without clear fiscal plans.

SDP’s vision is bold and inclusive but hinges on complex execution and public buy-in.

Verdict

Singapore’s housing crisis—skyrocketing prices, endless waits, and lease decay—demands more than manifesto bravado.

• PAP offers stability and supply but ducks affordability, betting voters will trust its track record over flashy fixes. Its plan will keep the system humming but won’t ease the squeeze.

• WP’s price-slashing ambition and retiree focus hit the mark but stumble on funding and supply, risking empty promises. Its heart is right, but its math is shaky.

• PSP’s radical AHS and youth appeal are electrifying but teeter on fiscal recklessness, ignoring older voters’ fears and homeowners who see housing as their nest egg. Its vision is thrilling but could crash the economy.

• SDP balances affordability, inclusivity, and demographic fixes with NOM flats and family-focused policies, but its complex mechanisms and revenue risks need ironclad execution. Its plan is ambitious but navigates a tightrope.

GE2025’s housing debate exposes a truth - no party has a silver bullet. Voters must weigh stability against bold reform, affordability against fiscal prudence, and inclusivity against execution risks.

Comparative Analysis

Disclaimer: This analysis is a speculative exploration based on geopolitical trends, historical patterns, and open-source intelligence.

Foreign interference isn’t a conspiracy theory; it’s a global reality, from Russia’s 2016 U.S. election hacks to China’s whispered influence in Australia.

Singapore, a tiny island with outsized influence, is a high-value target. Its role as a global financial hub, with approximately S$5.4 trillion in assets under management makes its electoral outcome a matter of international consequence.

China

China, Singapore’s largest trading partner with S$150 billion in bilateral trade in 2022, has strong incentives to influence GE2025.

As ASEAN’s diplomatic anchor, Singapore influences regional policies critical to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and South China Sea claims.

A government aligned with Beijing would enhance its dominance in Southeast Asia, where Singapore’s neutrality is a linchpin.

Moreover, Singapore’s military training partnerships with Taiwan make it a target for China’s efforts to suppress Taiwanese independence narratives.

Past disinformation campaigns

China has a well-documented history of disinformation:

• Taiwan: Beijing has used deepfakes and propaganda to discredit Taiwanese leaders and deter voters from supporting independence, targeting Chinese-speaking communities to sow division, as reported by regional security experts.

• Philippines: China has promoted narratives portraying itself as a constructive regional actor while casting doubt on U.S. reliability, aiming to weaken U.S.-Philippine ties, per the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

• Singapore (2017): A notable incident involved Huang Jing, a U.S. citizen and academic at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, who was expelled in August 2017 for acting as an agent of influence for a foreign country, widely understood to be China. Huang used his position to share privileged information with foreign intelligence operatives and attempted to influence Singapore’s foreign policy, per MHA.

Potential impact in Singapore

Singapore’s 74% ethnic Chinese population and economic ties with China create vulnerabilities to disinformation.

AI-generated deepfakes on platforms like Meta and Tiktok could depict candidates disparaging Chinese culture, alienating voters.

Cyber operations might target journalists of alternative and mainstream media outlets, while covert funding through Chinese business networks or clan associations could support pro-China candidates.

The October 2024 deepfake video targeting former President Halimah Yacob, falsely showing her criticizing the government, underscores this threat.

The 2020 case of Dickson Yeo, a Singaporean sentenced in the U.S. for spying for Chinese intelligence, further highlights Beijing’s use of local operatives, though Yeo claimed no disloyalty to Singapore.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s diplomatic leadership in ASEAN and military ties with Taiwan make it a strategic target.

China’s ambition to dominate ASEAN relies on influencing key players like Singapore, whose neutral stance could shift regional dynamics if manipulated.

Disinformation could erode public trust or promote candidates aligned with Beijing’s goals.

Israel

Israel, a key defense partner supplying Singapore with technologies like the Iron Dome, seeks to maintain a government supportive of bilateral ties.

As one of Singapore’s few ASEAN allies alongside Thailand, and with neighbors like Malaysia and Indonesia holding anti-Israel stances, Singapore’s pro-Israel policies are crucial.

A change in government could disrupt defense cooperation or weaken Israel’s Southeast Asian foothold, where Singapore is a diplomatic and technological hub.

Past disinformation campaigns

Israel’s disinformation efforts, particularly since the Gaza war, have aimed to shape global narratives:

• U.S. Lawmakers (2024): Israel funded a $2 million campaign through Stoic, a Tel Aviv-based firm, using 600 fake social media accounts to target 128 U.S. Congresspeople with pro-Israel messaging. Active as of June 2024, it employed AI tools like ChatGPT and fake news sites to attack UNRWA and influence policy (The New York Times, June 2024).

• Gaza War propaganda: AI-driven bot farms spread false narratives to dehumanize Palestinians and pressure policymakers, as reported by The Intercept in February 2024 (Gaza: Israel, Netanyahu, propaganda, lies, Palestinians).

• Meta censorship: Israel secured the removal of 38.8 million pro-Palestinian posts on Meta platforms by April 2025, aligning with efforts to suppress criticism (Dropsite News).

• Specific falsehoods: Misleading claims, such as audio evidence in the Gaza Baptist Hospital massacre, highlight tactical disinformation (Euronews, February 2024).

Potential impact on Singapore

Israel’s cyber capabilities, exemplified by tools like Pegasus and Graphite used in Singapore pose a threat.

While the 2024 Graphite spyware from Paragon Solutions was reportedly halted, Israel’s history with Pegasus—sold to various governments—suggests that comparable tools remain active.

Disinformation campaigns might target Singapore’s Malay-Muslim community (15% of the population) to counter anti-Israel sentiments, using bots on platforms like Meta.

Covert lobbying through defense or tech partnerships could subtly influence policy.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s status as a rare ASEAN ally makes it a linchpin for Israel’s regional strategy.

A pro-Israel government ensures sustained defense cooperation and counters regional hostility.

Disinformation could protect these ties by shaping elite perceptions or neutralizing anti-Israel narratives.

Singapore's defense capabilities

Singapore has fortified its electoral process against disinformation:

• Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act 2021 (FICA): Enables authorities to remove false content and scrutinize foreign funding, countering China’s deepfakes and Israel’s bot campaigns Countering Foreign Interference.

• Cybersecurity: The Cyber Security Agency (CSA) secures electoral systems, with 2023 advisories promoting robust digital protections Advisory to Presidential Election Candidates.

• Public resilience: Media literacy campaigns and high public trust (84% in government, 2023 Edelman Trust Barometer) equip citizens to identify disinformation Commentary: What Singapore can do more against rising threat of foreign interference.

The FICA law was in the news recently when four members of one of Singapore's richest families were designated as "politically significant persons" for their membership to a China political advisory body. MHA had emphasised that the four individuals had not engaged in any “egregious activity”. As such, their designation can be seen as a pre-emptive move to guard against any potential vulnerabilities to foreign interference.

Also last year, FICA was invoked to block 95 social media accounts linked to self-exiled Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui, the first time that the account restrictions directions under FICA were being deployed.

Foreign disinformation poses a significant threat to GE2025.

China aims to dominate ASEAN by leveraging Singapore’s diplomatic influence and cultural ties, while Israel seeks to preserve its strategic alliance.

Singapore’s FICA, cybersecurity, and public resilience provide a strong defense, but sustained vigilance is critical.

Enhanced cyber audits, monitoring of foreign networks, and public education will ensure Singapore’s vote remains untainted.

As GE2025 approaches, the nation’s commitment to sovereignty will determine its success in countering these threats.