On March 11, 2025, The Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg was accidentally added to a Signal chat with Trump’s top national security team—Michael Waltz, JD Vance, Pete Hegseth, Marco Rubio, Tulsi Gabbard, and more.

Dubbed "Houthi PC small group," the chat laid bare plans for a U.S. strike on Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

On March 15, Hegseth posted specifics: “1415: Strike Drones on Target,” alongside F-18 and Tomahawk timelines.

Hours later, the attack killed 31.

How it happened

The story begins on March 11, 2025, when Goldberg received a connection request on Signal, an encrypted messaging app, from a user identified as Michael Waltz—President Donald Trump’s national security adviser.

On March 13, Waltz added him to a chat labeled "Houthi PC small group" (likely shorthand for Principals Committee), which included 18 members such as Vice President JD Vance, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, and other key figures.

Unbeknownst to the group, Goldberg silently observed as officials discussed operational details of an imminent U.S. military strike against Yemen’s Houthi militants, a group that had been attacking international shipping in the Red Sea.

On March 15, at 11:44 AM ET, Hegseth posted a "TEAM UPDATE" with precise timelines, including the launch of F-18 jets, MQ-9 drones, and Tomahawk missiles, as well as weather conditions and targeting information. Hours later, the strikes commenced, killing at least 31 people according to Yemen’s Houthi-run health ministry.

Goldberg, lacking security clearance, did not participate in the chat and later removed himself, a move that would have notified Waltz as the group creator—yet no one followed up.

On March 24, he published his initial account in The Atlantic, withholding some specifics to avoid endangering U.S. personnel.

The next day, after administration officials repeatedly claimed no classified information was shared, the magazine released a fuller transcript on March 26, arguing that the public deserved transparency given the administration’s denials.

Broader implications

The leak exposed more than just military plans. It revealed internal tensions, with Vance urging a delay to avoid “bailing out Europe” (which relies heavily on Red Sea shipping) and Hegseth decrying “European free-loading.”

European allies reacted with alarm, with anonymous officials decrying the “reckless” breach and anti-European rhetoric. Allies like Samar Ali warned that partners might hesitate to share sensitive intelligence with the U.S. moving forward.

Domestically, the incident revived debates over government transparency and accountability.

The National Security Council is reviewing the incident, but accountability remains uncertain.

Read the full chat log

Singapore, situated outside the Pacific Ring of Fire and not on a plate boundary, faces a low earthquake risk, primarily from distant events on the Sunda Megathrust offshore Sumatra, about 400 km away.

Buildings are designed under the Eurocodes, adopted in 2013, which include earthquake resistance for low-risk areas, ensuring they can handle minor tremors. This makes Singapore buildings generally safe, though not for major earthquakes such as the one that occurred in Myanmar.

Singapore adopted earthquake-resistant design in 2013

Singapore's Building and Construction Authority (BCA) adopted the Eurocodes in 2013, including EN1998 Eurocode 8, which sets guidelines for earthquake-resistant design, particularly for buildings over 20 meters tall on soft soils.

These standards ensure buildings can withstand low-level seismic activity, with research suggesting they are sufficient for Singapore's context, though not designed for major earthquakes like those in high-risk zones.

Role of Chinese construction companies in Singapore

The recent 7.7 magnitude earthquake in central Myanmar on March 28, 2025, caused over 1,600 deaths and significant damage, with effects felt in Thailand, including a collapsed 33-story building in Bangkok involving China Railway Engineering Corporation.

The collapsed building in Bangkok, intended for the State Audit Office, was a joint venture between Italian-Thai Development Plc and China Railway Number 10 (Thailand) Ltd, a subsidiary of China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC), with the Chinese firm holding a 49% stake.

Chinese construction companies are active in Singapore, part of a competitive market valued at around $30 billion in 2019, with firms like China Construction Development listed among local players.

These companies must comply with Singapore's stringent building codes, ensuring their projects meet the same earthquake resistance standards as others.

The regulatory environment, with periodic reviews by the BCA, mitigates risks, with buildings required to withstand vibrations and shocks from potential tremors.

Track record of Chinese construction

The performance of Chinese-constructed buildings in earthquakes shows variation.

Traditional Chinese architecture, using dougong brackets, has demonstrated earthquake resistance, with structures like the Forbidden City enduring 200 earthquakes over 600 years.

However, modern constructions have faced criticism, notably in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where shoddy school construction led to collapses, attributed to poor enforcement and corruption.

The recent Bangkok collapse, involving CREC, raises similar concerns, but it was under construction, and other buildings in Bangkok did not collapse, suggesting context-specific factors.

Nearly two decades ago, Harpreet Nehal Singh — Harvard-educated, mentored by legal giant Davinder Singh, and bold enough to spar with Lee Kuan Yew on live television — sought entry into Singapore’s ruling elite.

Between 2005 to 2006, Harpreet met with the top brass of PAP's leadership - including multiple one-on-ones with Lee Hsien Loong, Tharman Shamugaratnam, S Jayakumar (then deputy prime minister) and the late Lee Kuan Yew.

As Jom confirms in a 2024 interview with Harpreet: “The cabinet deliberated” before rejecting him with the ambiguous, “There are different ways to contribute to this country.”

Now, at 59, Harpreet traded the establishment’s orbit for the opposition’s front line.

From PAP Aspirant to WP Member — or mole?

Harpreet's rejection didn’t end his political ambitions — he applied for an NMP role in 2007 but was again unsuccessful.

By the 2010s, Jom notes his growing disillusionment with PAP, mirrored by its declining vote share (75.3% in 2001 to 61.2% in 2020).

In 2021, he began volunteering with then - WP MP Leon Perera, and by 2023, he was seen in WP’s light blue uniform, engaging in walkabouts and Hammer newspaper sales.

The timing and context of Harpreet’s PAP meeting invite close to two decades ago invite speculation: was his rejection genuine, or a staged exit to position him as a long-term asset?

Meeting senior PAP leaders suggests trust — why entertain a high-profile candidate only to dismiss him without cause?

Harpreet is Establishment material

Harpreet’s resume screams establishment: Straits Times columns, elite circles, a career thriving in the PAP’s ecosystem.

His 2023 pivot to the WP feels dramatic—too dramatic, perhaps.

Jom quotes him decrying POFMA, Yale-NUS’s closure, and media control: “I don’t see this thing self-correcting.”

It’s a sharp but measured critique, never fully anti-establishment - almost as if he’s playing a part, staying within bounds set by unseen handlers. But it’s also rehearsed, polished — “carefully primed, bullet-proofed,” as Jom puts it.

Could Harpreet’s 2005-2006 encounter have been a directive to embed himself elsewhere, resurfacing in the WP as it gains traction ahead of the 2025 General Election?

The mole hypothesis

Here’s the theory: the PAP, masters of control, saw in Harpreet not a liability but an asset.

They let him simmer, maintaining his insider ties — think Davinder Singh’s mentorship, his establishment perch — while grooming him for a covert role.

That 2005-2006 meeting wasn’t a dead end — it was a starting line. He’s not hiding disillusionment; he’s concealing loyalty.

The WP’s growth threatens the PAP’s grip; who better to embed than a credentialed ally who can pass as a convert?

If he wins a seat, he’s not just a voice — he’s a listener, a conduit back to the ruling elite.

Jom calls him a potential “big fish” for the opposition, but what if he’s bait, dangling to keep the WP in check?

The PAP didn’t lose him — they deployed him.

Harpreet the Harpoon

Harpreet’s WP role is public: he’s been photographed with leaders like Pritam Singh and Sylvia Lim, and his March 18, 2025, Facebook post declares pride in the party, advocating “balanced politics.”

Yet, the PAP’s silence on his departure is telling — no rebuttal, no narrative.

His insider roots — mentored by Davinder Singh, a PAP stalwart — contrast with his late opposition turn at 59.

The WP’s rise (10 seats in 2020) makes it a target for monitoring; Harpreet, with his credentials, fits as a potential plant.

No hard proof exists — his 2005-2006 meeting’s details remain opaque — but the hypothesis lingers.

What’s 'Harpreet the Harpoon' burying? A directive, whispered by senior leaders, to infiltrate and report? A promise of reward if he pulls it off? He’s not the naive reformer Jom lionizes; he’s a chess piece, moved by the party he claims to oppose.

Evidence is thin, but the pattern fits: a man too connected to break free, too strategic to act on whim.

What’s next?

Harpreet’s next steps will clarify his intent.

If he contests in 2025 and wins, his parliamentary actions — loyalty to WP or subtle PAP alignment — could reveal more.

For now, his journey from a 2005-2006 PAP meeting to WP prominence is fact; whether it masks a mole’s agenda is conjecture.

The timeline holds: he met PAP leaders nearly two decades ago, was rebuffed, and now challenges them — or does he?

新加坡最迟须在2025年11月举行大选，而工人党（WP）正高调造势，仿佛已准备好接管政权。

该党目前拥有10个议席（阿裕尼、盛港和后港），如今更瞄准其他选区如马林百列、东海岸、淡滨尼及白沙—榜鹅。随着新面孔涌现，包括资深律师哈普雷特·辛格（Harpreet Singh）的加入，坊间热议“蓝色浪潮（指工人党支持率的上升势头）”即将来袭。

但在欢呼声背后，工人党的执政表现却一团糟。我们真该给这些人更多话语权吗？且让我们深入分析。

工人党连胜势头强劲

工人党深谙胜选之道。2011年，陈硕茂助该党夺下阿裕尼集选区，震惊人民行动党（PAP）。

2020年，林志蔚（Jamus Lim）以“暖我的心房（warm my cockles，指感动人心）”的言论赢得盛港选区，此言至今仍被津津乐道。

如今，新晋党员哈普雷特·辛格·内哈尔（Harpreet Singh Nehal）——这位从知名律师转型的政坛新人——可能成为下一颗明星。他被发现活跃于马林百列选区，其履历令人瞩目（堪称法庭精英与草根战士的结合体）。

尽管行动党和新加坡前进党（PSP）也推出新人，但工人党团队更显亲民——少些官僚做派，多些“感同身受”的共鸣。

再夺四个集选区？根据2020年选举数据，该党在竞争选区得票率达50.49%，而东部地区饱受生活压力的家庭或许会转向工人党。但胜选是一回事，执政能力则是另一回事。

未来英雄还是危机暗涌？

真相如下：工人党包袱重重。

林志蔚虽魅力十足，但他关于不平等的“觉醒”言论更适合TikTok，难吸引只求鸡饭降价的基层选民。

党魁普里坦·辛格（Pritam Singh）因就拉希莎·汗（Raeesah Khan）事件向国会特权委员会撒谎，刚被罚款1.4万新元。这一污点令反对党领袖形象蒙尘。

2023年，梁文辉（Leon Perera）与妮可·Seah（Nicole Seah）的绯闻风波？比起严肃政治，更像肥皂剧情节。

这些并非偶然失误，而是判断力持续欠佳的体现。工人党绝非行动党那般纪律严明的“钢铁坦克”，反倒像一辆吱呀作响的破旧摩托。

工人党应获更多权力吗？

若工人党大胜（例如阿裕尼59%、盛港52%、东部两集选区51%，总议席超20席），这并非因其完美无缺，而是选民渴求变革。物价飞涨、住房压力、年轻世代不满现状——工人党正瞄准这些痛点。哈普雷特或许是助力，但他们的政策构想必须比失误更耀眼。

他们高呼公平，但能否在执政时不自乱阵脚？国会辩论或将更激烈，但也可能更失序。

关键结论

工人党虽有胜绩与豪言，但其光环正迅速褪色。哈普雷特等新面孔无法掩盖裂痕——执政能力不稳、领袖信誉存疑、丑闻接连不断。其竞选宣言固然可观，但带来的混乱恐得不偿失。

若你已厌倦行动党执政，大可支持工人党，但别期待奇迹——唯有更多的喧嚣罢了。

Singapore’s General Election is due by November 2025, and the Workers’ Party (WP) is hyping itself like it's ready to take over.

They’ve already got 10 seats—Aljunied, Sengkang, and Hougang—and now they’re eyeing more, like Marine Parade, East Coast, Tampines, and Pasir Ris-Punggol. With new faces popping up and a fancy Senior Counsel named Harpreet Singh joining the crew, people are buzzing about a “blue wave.”

But beyond the cheerleading, their track record’s a mess. Should we really give these folks a bigger mic? Let’s dig in.

WP has been on a winning streak

WP knows how to pull off a victory. In 2011, Chen Show Mao helped them snag Aljunied GRC, shocking the PAP.

In 2020, Jamus Lim’s charm won Sengkang with that “warm my cockles” moment we’re still quoting.

Now, Harpreet Singh Nehal—big-deal lawyer turned WP newbie—might be their next star. Spotted in Marine Parade, he’s got the resume to turn heads (think courtroom boss meets grassroots warrior).

Other parties like PAP and PSP are also bringing newbies, but WP’s crew feels like they’re ready to connect—think less suits, more “I get you” energy.

Four more GRCs? They pulled 50.49% in contested seats last time, and the east—full of stressed-out families—might bite. But winning’s one thing; delivering’s another.

Upcoming heroes or a brewing hot mess?

Here’s the tea: WP’s got baggage.

Jamus Lim’s a charmer, but his woke rants on inequality sound like a uni lecture—great for TikTok, less for heartlanders who just want cheaper chicken rice.

Pritam Singh, their leader, just got fined $14,000 for lying to a parliamentary committee about Raeesah Khan. That's a red flag and it’s not a great look for the Leader of the Opposition.

And 2023’s Leon Perera-Nicole Seah affair drama? More soap opera than serious vibes.

These aren’t one-off flubs; they’re a pattern of sloppy judgment. WP’s not the PAP’s well-oiled tank—they’re more like a rickety scooter.

So, should WP get more power?

If WP scores big—say, 20+ seats with wins like 59% in Aljunied, 52% in Sengkang, and 51% in a couple eastern GRCs—it’s less about them being flawless and more about the electorate wanting change. Skyrocketing costs, housing stress, young people over it—WP’s tapping that. Harpreet could be the boost they need, but their ideas have to shine brighter than their slip-ups.

They’re loud about fairness, but can they run the show without tripping over themselves? Parliament might get spicier, but it could also get sloppier.

The bottom line

WP’s got some wins and big talk, but their shine’s fading fast. New faces like Harpreet can’t hide the cracks—shaky delivery, sketchy leaders, and scandals that won’t quit. Their manifesto’s fine, but it’s not worth the chaos they drag in.

Root for them if you’re over PAP’s rule, but don’t expect miracles—just more noise.