Disclaimer: This analysis is a speculative exploration based on geopolitical trends, historical patterns, and open-source intelligence.

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Foreign interference isn’t a conspiracy theory; it’s a global reality, from Russia’s 2016 U.S. election hacks to China’s whispered influence in Australia.

Singapore, a tiny island with outsized influence, is a high-value target. Its role as a global financial hub, with approximately S$5.4 trillion in assets under management makes its electoral outcome a matter of international consequence.

China

China, Singapore’s largest trading partner with S$150 billion in bilateral trade in 2022, has strong incentives to influence GE2025.

As ASEAN’s diplomatic anchor, Singapore influences regional policies critical to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and South China Sea claims.

A government aligned with Beijing would enhance its dominance in Southeast Asia, where Singapore’s neutrality is a linchpin.

Moreover, Singapore’s military training partnerships with Taiwan make it a target for China’s efforts to suppress Taiwanese independence narratives.

Past disinformation campaigns

China has a well-documented history of disinformation:

• Taiwan: Beijing has used deepfakes and propaganda to discredit Taiwanese leaders and deter voters from supporting independence, targeting Chinese-speaking communities to sow division, as reported by regional security experts.

• Philippines: China has promoted narratives portraying itself as a constructive regional actor while casting doubt on U.S. reliability, aiming to weaken U.S.-Philippine ties, per the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

• Singapore (2017): A notable incident involved Huang Jing, a U.S. citizen and academic at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, who was expelled in August 2017 for acting as an agent of influence for a foreign country, widely understood to be China. Huang used his position to share privileged information with foreign intelligence operatives and attempted to influence Singapore’s foreign policy, per MHA.

Potential impact in Singapore

Singapore’s 74% ethnic Chinese population and economic ties with China create vulnerabilities to disinformation.

AI-generated deepfakes on platforms like Meta and Tiktok could depict candidates disparaging Chinese culture, alienating voters.

Cyber operations might target journalists of alternative and mainstream media outlets, while covert funding through Chinese business networks or clan associations could support pro-China candidates.

The October 2024 deepfake video targeting former President Halimah Yacob, falsely showing her criticizing the government, underscores this threat.

The 2020 case of Dickson Yeo, a Singaporean sentenced in the U.S. for spying for Chinese intelligence, further highlights Beijing’s use of local operatives, though Yeo claimed no disloyalty to Singapore.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s diplomatic leadership in ASEAN and military ties with Taiwan make it a strategic target.

China’s ambition to dominate ASEAN relies on influencing key players like Singapore, whose neutral stance could shift regional dynamics if manipulated.

Disinformation could erode public trust or promote candidates aligned with Beijing’s goals.

Israel

Israel, a key defense partner supplying Singapore with technologies like the Iron Dome, seeks to maintain a government supportive of bilateral ties.

As one of Singapore’s few ASEAN allies alongside Thailand, and with neighbors like Malaysia and Indonesia holding anti-Israel stances, Singapore’s pro-Israel policies are crucial.

A change in government could disrupt defense cooperation or weaken Israel’s Southeast Asian foothold, where Singapore is a diplomatic and technological hub.

Past disinformation campaigns

Israel’s disinformation efforts, particularly since the Gaza war, have aimed to shape global narratives:

• U.S. Lawmakers (2024): Israel funded a $2 million campaign through Stoic, a Tel Aviv-based firm, using 600 fake social media accounts to target 128 U.S. Congresspeople with pro-Israel messaging. Active as of June 2024, it employed AI tools like ChatGPT and fake news sites to attack UNRWA and influence policy (The New York Times, June 2024).

• Gaza War propaganda: AI-driven bot farms spread false narratives to dehumanize Palestinians and pressure policymakers, as reported by The Intercept in February 2024 (Gaza: Israel, Netanyahu, propaganda, lies, Palestinians).

• Meta censorship: Israel secured the removal of 38.8 million pro-Palestinian posts on Meta platforms by April 2025, aligning with efforts to suppress criticism (Dropsite News).

• Specific falsehoods: Misleading claims, such as audio evidence in the Gaza Baptist Hospital massacre, highlight tactical disinformation (Euronews, February 2024).

Potential impact on Singapore

Israel’s cyber capabilities, exemplified by tools like Pegasus and Graphite used in Singapore pose a threat.

While the 2024 Graphite spyware from Paragon Solutions was reportedly halted, Israel’s history with Pegasus—sold to various governments—suggests that comparable tools remain active.

Disinformation campaigns might target Singapore’s Malay-Muslim community (15% of the population) to counter anti-Israel sentiments, using bots on platforms like Meta.

Covert lobbying through defense or tech partnerships could subtly influence policy.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s status as a rare ASEAN ally makes it a linchpin for Israel’s regional strategy.

A pro-Israel government ensures sustained defense cooperation and counters regional hostility.

Disinformation could protect these ties by shaping elite perceptions or neutralizing anti-Israel narratives.

Singapore's defense capabilities

Singapore has fortified its electoral process against disinformation:

• Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act 2021 (FICA): Enables authorities to remove false content and scrutinize foreign funding, countering China’s deepfakes and Israel’s bot campaigns Countering Foreign Interference.

• Cybersecurity: The Cyber Security Agency (CSA) secures electoral systems, with 2023 advisories promoting robust digital protections Advisory to Presidential Election Candidates.

• Public resilience: Media literacy campaigns and high public trust (84% in government, 2023 Edelman Trust Barometer) equip citizens to identify disinformation Commentary: What Singapore can do more against rising threat of foreign interference.

The FICA law was in the news recently when four members of one of Singapore's richest families were designated as "politically significant persons" for their membership to a China political advisory body. MHA had emphasised that the four individuals had not engaged in any “egregious activity”. As such, their designation can be seen as a pre-emptive move to guard against any potential vulnerabilities to foreign interference.

Also last year, FICA was invoked to block 95 social media accounts linked to self-exiled Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui, the first time that the account restrictions directions under FICA were being deployed.

Foreign disinformation poses a significant threat to GE2025.

China aims to dominate ASEAN by leveraging Singapore’s diplomatic influence and cultural ties, while Israel seeks to preserve its strategic alliance.

Singapore’s FICA, cybersecurity, and public resilience provide a strong defense, but sustained vigilance is critical.

Enhanced cyber audits, monitoring of foreign networks, and public education will ensure Singapore’s vote remains untainted.

As GE2025 approaches, the nation’s commitment to sovereignty will determine its success in countering these threats.

Back in 2015, during the General Election’s Cooling-Off Day — a sacred 24-hour no-campaigning zone— Vivian Balakrishnan’s Facebook page was caught posting.

The Elections Department (ELD) issued a stern reminder about the rules, and Vivian’s team chalked it up to a “technical bug” causing “recurrent auto-posting,” later confirmed by Facebook (Straits Times, 2015).

Most gave Vivian the benefit of the doubt but fast-forward a decade, and that “one-off” glitch is starting to look like a feature, not a bug.

Another "bug" bites

On March 13, 2025, Vivian’s official Facebook page “liked” a post by Calvin Cheng suggesting pro-Palestinian activists be shipped to Gaza with no return ticket — a diplomatic disaster in a single click.

The backlash was instant, with netizens and activist groups like Monday of Palestine Solidarity slamming it as tone-deaf, especially given Vivian’s parliamentary nods to Palestinian causes.

By April 2, Vivian denied liking the post, claiming “unauthorized activity” and reporting it to Meta for investigation.

One too many glitches

Vivian’s social media has gone off-script, and the “bug” excuse is wearing thin.

In 2015, we could shrug it off—social media was still a wild frontier, and bugs weren’t uncommon.

But in 2025, when Singaporeans are dodging phishing scams and securing their Singpass with 2FA, a minister’s verified account getting “hacked” or “bugged” raises red flags.

When a minister’s account keeps glitching, it erodes confidence.

If Vivian’s team can’t secure a Facebook page, how do we trust them with cybersecurity or foreign policy?

With GE2025 looming, Singaporeans want leaders who can keep up — on policy and on Facebook.

Anything less, and Vivian risks being debugged by the ballot box.

Ariffin Sha, founder of Wake Up Singapore and Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) candidate for GE2025, and Raeesah Khan, former Workers’ Party MP have one thing in common: a failure to uphold truth.

Both, in their respective arenas—alternative media and Parliament—have faltered, revealing a troubling symmetry.

Ariffin is the male counterpart to Raeesah, not in ambition or ideology, but in their shared disregard for facts when narrative suits their cause.

Background

Ariffin, a 27-year-old law graduate and SDP candidate for Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC, built Wake Up Singapore (WUSG) as a platform for socio-political commentary.

A legal executive by day, he manages WUSG, which boasts over 100,000 followers.

In March 2022, WUSG published a fabricated story about a miscarriage at KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital (KKH), alleging staff mishandled a foetus.

The claim, based on doctored documents from KKH patient Ma Su Nandar Htwe, was false.

Ariffin’s platform failed to verify the story, leading to a criminal defamation charge, a guilty plea, and an S$8,000 fine in August 2024. His apology and retraction came only after exposure, too late to restore trust in KKH, which serves 12,000 inpatients annually.

Raeesah Khan, a 31-year-old former MP for Sengkang GRC, committed a parallel offense in August 2021. She claimed in Parliament to have accompanied a rape victim to a police station, where an officer made insensitive remarks. This was a lie, admitted three months later, rooted in her personal trauma but lacking any factual basis.

Her resignation from the Workers’ Party and a recommended S$35,000 fine followed, alongside a breach of parliamentary privilege that eroded trust in elected officials.

Both Ariffin and Raeesah leveraged significant platforms—WUSG’s social media reach and Khan’s parliamentary pulpit—to amplify unverified claims.

Both tackled sensitive issues (healthcare and sexual assault) that demand rigor, not recklessness.

Their admissions of fault, only after being cornered, reveal a willingness to prioritize narrative over truth, whether driven by zeal or negligence.

Dr Chee pleads for "mature" political discourse

At SDP's press conference, Dr Chee was asked how he would respond to any voters concerned about Mr Ariffin Sha’s previous conviction.

He claimed Ariffin had “very ably” made a case for younger Singaporeans and urged a focus on issues over personal attacks. “We want (the) Singapore political system to mature… where we can talk about issues and not go back into past practices where we are just destroying people in terms of talking about their personalities,” Chee said.

He compared Ariffin’s case to PAP politicians’ mistakes, citing former Speaker Tan Chuan-Jin, who resigned in 2023 over an extramarital affair with a Tampines GRC MP. “We want to be judged by the same standards,” Chee added, rejecting “personal demonization.”

Mr Tan resigned from his position and from the PAP in 2024 over an affair he had with a fellow party member who was a Tampines GRC MP.

“We want to be judged by the same standards,” Dr Chee said, adding that he wished to avoid a situation of “personal demonization, that is not in keeping with a mature civilized election campaign”.

Comparing Sha’s conviction to PAP’s Tan Chuan-Jin’s personal scandal, however, is a false equivalence—adultery doesn’t undermine public institutions; spreading falsehoods does.

Chee’s plea to focus on “issues” over “personalities” conveniently ignores that Sha’s lapse is the issue: judgment matters in leadership.

Raeesah’s case is equally indefensible.

Her lie, though tied to personal trauma, was not a slip but a calculated statement repeated thrice in Parliament, undermining the Workers’ Party’s credibility and fueling skepticism about opposition accountability.

Weaponizing sensitivities for moral posturing

Both cases expose a deeper issue: the temptation to weaponize sensitive topics for clout or moral posturing.

Ariffin and Raeesah, in their respective roles, failed to grasp the weight of their platforms, treating truth as negotiable when it suited their ends.

As GE2025 looms, Ariffin's candidacy with SDP and Raeesah's retreat from politics highlight divergent paths but a shared lesson: public figures must be held to a higher standard.

Voters in Marsiling-Yew Tee deserve candidates who prioritize evidence over emotion.

Ariffin's fine may close his legal chapter, but his platform’s lapse raises questions about his judgment. Raeesah's resignation, while accountability of a sort, leaves a stain on the opposition’s claim to moral high ground.

Whether in media or Parliament, the duty to verify, clarify, and rectify is non-negotiable.

Anything less is a disservice to the nation.

Can Singapore stay neutral in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape?

Former Trade Minister and current Minister of Education Chan Chun Sing’s said in a CNA podcast that it's not about choosing sides—sometimes that’s decided for you—but about making Singapore so valuable that everyone wants a piece.

While Chan’s perspective highlights Singapore’s pragmatic diplomacy, it sidesteps a stark reality: neutrality, in the face of deep economic and strategic entanglements with both the US and China, is a mirage.

Neutrality promises impartiality but Singapore's reality mocks it

Singapore cannot be truly neutral in the US-China tariff war due to its deep economic, strategic, and geopolitical entanglements with both powers.

In 2023, China devoured 14% of Singapore’s exports ($83 billion) and supplied 13% of imports, while the US took 13% of exports ($76 billion) and 10% of imports.

US foreign direct investment ($234 billion) is a growth engine, while China’s Belt and Road Initiative exploits Singapore’s ports, processing 37 million TEUs in 2024.

Singapore backs US-led Indo-Pacific frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Launched in 2022, IPEF’s 14-nation coalition (excluding China) aims to boost trade and supply chains.

China, excluded from IPEF, views it as a US strategy to counter its regional influence, a sentiment echoed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who labeled it an attempt to “decouple” economically and “incite confrontation.”

In 2024, China’s state media jabbed at Singapore’s IPEF role, hinting at trade blowback but nothing came out of it as of today. However, the message was clear: neutrality is a fantasy when your biggest trading partner feels betrayed.

Walking a regional tightrope with ASEAN

Singapore’s security reliance on the US, especially for deterrence in a volatile region, tilts its strategic calculus.

Neutrality would require distancing itself from US defense cooperation, but this is unlikely given Singapore’s need for a counterbalance to regional threats, including China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea that affects ASEAN.

Singapore has no claims but supports a rules-based order, implicitly aligning with US freedom-of-navigation operations against China’s claims. This stance, articulated in Singapore’s 2024 Foreign Policy Report, draws China’s ire, undermining perceptions of neutrality.

As an ASEAN linchpin, Singapore pushes for regional unity but ASEAN’s fractures—Cambodia and Laos cozy up to China, while the Philippines and Vietnam lean US—make neutrality a diplomatic minefield.

Singapore's real play is not neutrality, but power

Choosing neutrality would mean avoiding economic and security alignment with either side, but Singapore’s reliance on both markets forces pragmatic engagement.

Favoring one risks alienating the other, yet remaining aloof could marginalize Singapore in global trade networks.

Instead, Singapore pursues strategic autonomy—hedging bets, diversifying partners, and maximizing flexibility. This approach, allows Singapore to navigate the conflict without being fully subsumed by either side.

In 2023, Singapore's S$600 billion economy grew 1.2% despite tariff headwinds, proving its adaptability.

Singapore’s edge lies not in avoiding sides but in making itself so valuable that sides compete to win its favor.

That’s not neutrality — it’s power.

2025年5月3日，Jalan Kayu单选区（Jalan Kayu SMC）的29,565名选民将站在十字路口，选择两条崎岖路径之一：人民行动党（PAP）职总秘书长黄志明，背负2024年职总英康收购案的污点，宛如一辆伤痕累累的战车；抑或红点团结党（RDU）的激进教育家卡拉·马尼卡姆，其2021年前进党诉讼风波暴露的个人主义倾向，恰似一艘独木舟在政治风浪中摇摆 [译注：2025年4月22日，红点团结党宣布退出Jalan Kayu单选区，支持工人党参选，以避免多角竞争。本文基于此前候选人假设撰写]。

候选人背景

黄志明（56岁）

黄志明曾于2009至2013年担任新加坡空军总长，2013至2015年升任三军总长，展现军事生涯的严谨与权威。2015年，他代表人民行动党当选巴西立-榜鹅集选区国会议员，但在2020年竞逐盛港集选区时，以47.88%的得票率铩羽而归。自2018年起，他担任职总秘书长，力推劳动力发展和工人权益政策，试图为职场注入活力。然而，2024年职总英康收购案令其公信力蒙尘，被舆论抨击“要么纵容利益输送，要么严重失职”，如同一座信任堡垒被风暴侵蚀。

卡拉·马尼卡姆（57岁）

卡拉·马尼卡姆是单亲母亲、特殊教育专家兼中小企业主，拥有终身教育硕士学位，散发草根魅力。她是新加坡武装部队首批女军官之一，服役七年，官至中尉，彰显坚韧。2020年，她代表前进党竞选义顺集选区，获38.76%选票；同年12月被开除，2021年提起“不当终止党籍”诉讼，后和解。此事暴露其“独行侠”作风。如今，她加入红点团结党，聚焦职业培训和生活成本压力，试图以小党之力撬动选民心弦。

黄志明的职总英康风波

2024年7月，职总与德国保险巨头英杰华（Allianz）提出22亿新元的收购案，宣称将增强职总英康的竞争力。8月，黄志明与职总主席达纳拉克希米发表联合声明，信誓旦旦保证英杰华将维护英康的社会使命。然而，细节如暗礁般浮现，险些葬送交易。英杰华计划提取18.5亿新元资本，近半投资可迅速回笼，恐耗尽维持低保费的储备金，宛如从社会保障的根基抽梁换柱。2024年10月14日，文化、社区及青年部长唐振辉代表政府果断叫停交易，认定其背离英康2022年公司化目标，即强化财务实力以惠及保单持有人。

黄志明坚称职总中央委员会对资本提取计划毫不知情，试图撇清责任，但前英康首席执行官陈瑞财痛斥该计划“违背诚信”，直指交易暗藏私利。新加坡管理大学副教授陈庆文直言，这种无知“令人瞠目结舌” [译注：意指难以置信的疏忽]，如同指挥官在战场上迷失方向。2025年1月，黄志明将就业不稳定性归咎于人工智能，回避外籍劳工政策争议，被批“高高在上”，如同一座与民意脱节的孤塔。2020年盛港集选区失利已暴露其政治软肋，选民不禁质疑：他究竟是工人代言人，还是行动党机器的忠实齿轮？

卡拉的前进党诉讼争议

2021年7月，卡拉向高等法院起诉前进党，后移交国家法院，掀起政治风波。她要求宣告2020年12月开除决定“违法无效”，并追讨1万新元竞选开支，指控前进党违宪，未给予她申辩机会。前进党提交七份宣誓书，包括党魁陈清木的证词，指控她破坏团队凝聚力、抗命不遵。同区候选人郑德源透露，她跳过团队会议、擅自组织走访，形同独奏而非合唱。17人联署反对其复职，干部以55:11的投票支持开除决定。

陈清木回忆，2020年11月会议上，卡拉“挑衅好斗”，高喊“证据呢？证据呢？”，如同一头不甘受缚的猛兽。她通过脸书和法庭公开控诉，展现原则性，却也暴露分裂倾向，宛如在政治舞台上独舞。转投红点团结党被批“机会主义”，如同一名独行侠在寻找新战场。诉讼虽和解，但卡拉的个人主义标签挥之不去，恐难适应新加坡强调协作的政治生态。

选情分析

黄志明依托行动党强大的基层网络，Jalan Kayu单选区与宏茂桥集选区的历史渊源为其加分。然而，英康风波重创公信力，盛港失利阴影犹存，选民质疑其是否真为工人发声。卡拉的草根形象贴近民心，反对党协调机制或助其整合选票，但诉讼风波暴露团队协作缺陷，红点团结党知名度有限，难以撼动主流。工人党未派候选人，人民力量党若参选可能分散反对派选票，但红点团结党与其他小党的协调或可缓解分裂风险。这场选举无关谁是耀眼的明星，而是两块“卡由”（马来语“木头”谐音，喻指不完美的候选人）中，谁能更稳固地承载选民的期望。