The Progress Singapore Party (PSP) released its manifesto for Singapore's 2025 General Election, titled “Progress for All,” outlining over 60 policy proposals to address key national issues.

The manifesto focuses on building a fair society, ensuring dignified living standards, providing diverse educational pathways, and strengthening democratic institutions.

Below is a detailed, reorganized summary of the manifesto’s key points, structured for clarity and coherence, based on the provided document.

1. Cost of Living

The PSP addresses Singapore’s escalating cost of living, driven by a 18% rise in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from July 2020 to February 2025, with specific increases in hawker food (20%), public transport (20%), and water prices (18%). The GST hike from 7% to 9% in 2024 and soaring HDB resale prices (50% increase from Q2 2020 to Q4 2024) exacerbate the burden, while median wages have only risen 21% from $4,534 to $5,500.

• GST Reduction and Exemptions:
  • Reduce GST to 7%, arguing it’s regressive and Singapore’s $1.2 trillion reserves (12 years of government expenditure) allow fiscal flexibility.
  • Exempt basic essentials (e.g., water, rice, eggs, cooking oil, formula milk) from GST, with price thresholds (e.g., rice under $2/kg) to target lower-income households.
• Land Cost Reforms:
  • Defer land cost for HDB Build-To-Order (BTO) flats, recording it at sale and recovering it with interest upon resale, treating public housing as essential infrastructure like schools.
  • Treat land sales proceeds as revenue over the lease period (e.g., 99 years), allowing 5% annual draw for budget use, providing a cumulative revenue stream without depleting reserves.
• Commercial Rent Control:
  • Have the Fair Tenancy Industry Committee (FTIC) issue guidelines on annual rent increases for commercial properties, aligning with economic growth to moderate business costs.
• Hawker Centre Reforms:
  • Set hawker stall rents at $500/month or 3% of gross turnover (whichever is higher), replacing the tender system to lower costs (current median: $1,625/month).
  • Phase out Socially-conscious Enterprise Hawker Centres (SEHCs) and centralize management under a new agency, “Hawker Singapore,” to reduce costs and promote hawker culture.
• Food Affordability:
  • Provide government-funded food discounts for Pioneer Generation, Merdeka Generation, and CHAS cardholders at hawker centres, funded by respective funds.
  • Increase CDC Vouchers for lower-income households to offset food costs, relieving hawkers from funding budget meals.
• Healthcare Affordability:
  • Nationalize MediShield Life and CareShield Life, with government-funded premiums for all Singaporeans, costing $2-3 billion annually to ease premium burdens.
  • Centralize drug procurement for public and private healthcare facilities to reduce costs through bulk bargaining.
  • Offer a $3,000 “HealthierMother” cash gift per child to defray confinement costs post-childbirth.

2. Housing

The PSP critiques the BTO system’s long waiting times and rising resale prices (50% increase from Q2 2020 to Q4 2024), driven by land costs (60% of BTO costs) and lease decay concerns. The government’s subsidies to keep BTO prices affordable increase fiscal burdens, necessitating a rethink of housing policies.

• Affordable Homes Scheme (AHS):
  • Replace BTO with AHS, selling flats at construction cost plus a location-based premium, excluding land cost unless sold on the resale market.
  • Ensure affordability without depleting CPF savings, severing the link between housing and retirement, with minimal impact on resale market due to limited supply (20,000 flats/year).
• Singles Housing Access:
  • Allow singles aged 28+ to buy 2- and 3-room BTO flats and all resale flats in any estate, compared to the current age 35 limit for 2-room Flexi BTOs.
• Increase Flat Supply:
  • Build more flats based on forecasted demand (e.g., marriage and birth rates), using unused state properties (e.g., former schools) to reduce waiting times.
• Millennial Apartments Scheme:
  • Offer affordable, high-quality rental apartments in the CBD and mature estates for young couples/singles on 2-5 year leases, providing flexibility and reducing pressure to buy early.

3. Jobs and Wages

With foreign workers comprising 39% of the workforce, the PSP aims to prioritize Singaporeans while ensuring fair competition and better work-life balance, addressing overwork (90% work beyond official hours) and wage stagnation.

• Minimum Living Wage:
  • Set a $2,250/month minimum wage ($1,800 take-home after CPF), based on 2019 Minimum Income Standard, to ensure dignity and reduce reliance on subsidies.
• Foreign Worker Policies:
  • Strengthen the Fair Consideration Framework (FCF) by extending job ad periods, requiring more ads, and proving no suitable Singaporean candidate.
  • Introduce per-company EP quotas, with higher quotas for SMEs, to balance global talent access and local priority.
  • Impose a $1,200/month EP levy to offset employers’ CPF savings on foreign workers.
  • Raise EP minimum qualifying salary to $10,000/month (from $5,600-$10,700).
  • Limit single-nationality work pass holders per company to prevent workplace enclaves.
• Worker Protections:
  • Exempt retrenched employees from non-compete clauses to ease job transitions.
  • Mandate statutory retrenchment benefits (2 weeks’ salary per year of service for 2+ years’ service), exempting small or bankrupt firms.
• Parental Leave:
  • Equalize parental leave at 15 weeks per parent (4 weeks maternity/paternity, 22 weeks shared equally), promoting shared parenting responsibilities.
• Family-Friendly Employers:
  • Offer incentives like higher foreign worker quotas to employers supporting parental leave.

4. Social Safety Net

The PSP seeks to simplify and strengthen social support, reducing reliance on complex schemes and supporting caregivers, seniors, and healthcare needs.

• Redundancy Insurance:
  • Introduce a scheme paying 75% of the last-drawn salary for 6 months (capped at $3,750/month), funded by 0.5% monthly contributions from employers/employees.
• Caregiver Support:
  • Provide a $1,250/month allowance (including CPF) for full-time caregivers of children under 7, costing up to $2.5 billion annually, replacing childcare subsidies.
• Silver Support Scheme:
  • Double payouts to $430-$2,160/quarter ($144-$720/month), based on flat type and income, for seniors with low retirement savings.
• Pioneer and Merdeka Funds:
  • Publish projected investment income and ensure full utilization of funds ($5.52 billion for PG, $5.55 billion for MG as of March 2024).
• CPF Lifetime Retirement Investment Scheme (LRIS):
  • Implement LRIS, allowing investment in low-fee, diversified funds (6-10% annual returns over 5 years, per US 401(k) data), boosting retirement savings.
• MediSave Expansion:
  • Increase MediSave500/700 withdrawal limits ($500/$700 annually for outpatient care) and cover preventive dental treatments, maternity fees, and egg freezing.
• Fertility Support:
  • Offer 75% co-funding for unlimited ART cycles for women under 40 (until 2 children), and 3 fresh/3 frozen cycles for ages 40-45.
• Mental Health:
  • Increase MediSave withdrawal limits for mental health treatments (e.g., schizophrenia, depression), regulate counsellors, and reduce public hospital waiting times (47 days for psychiatrists, 36 for psychologists in 2023).

5. Education

Despite Singapore’s top PISA 2022 rankings, the PSP critiques over-reliance on tuition ($104.80/month household expenditure in 2023) and high-stakes exams, which foster fear of failure (2018 PISA). The system should offer diverse pathways and equal opportunities.

• Through-Train Programme:
  • Pilot a 10-year programme (Primary 1 to Secondary 4) with optional PSLE, emphasizing holistic curricula (arts, humanities, sports) and flexible assessments.
• School Size Diversity:
  • Maintain a range of school sizes, avoiding mergers to preserve heritage and support diverse needs (e.g., neurodivergent students).
• Assessment Reform:
  • Reduce reliance on summative exams, using portfolios and projects to foster critical thinking, collaboration, and creativity.
• Smaller Class Sizes:
  • Lower class sizes (from 33.6 primary, 32.6 secondary in 2023) by re-employing older teachers as Flexi-Adjuncts and using technology to reduce administrative burdens.
• Mental Health Support:
  • Conduct annual mental health assessments for students, increase school counsellors to 2 per school (from 1 in two-thirds of schools), and monitor teacher burnout.
• International Students:
  • Limit scholarships/tuition grants for international students (10% of AU undergrads, $238 million in 2019), prioritizing full-fee payers to subsidize locals.
• University Access:
  • Review AU places for Singaporeans, especially in Medicine, and expand vocational pathways (e.g., WSQ qualifications) for university admission.

6. Governance

The PSP addresses concerns over the PAP’s parliamentary dominance, lack of checks and balances, and recent policy missteps (e.g., Covid-19 dormitory outbreaks, SimplyGo reversal). It seeks to enhance transparency and accountability.

• Ministerial Salaries:
  • Benchmark salaries to median Singaporean income (not top 1,000 earners) to reflect public service ethos.
• Asset Declarations:
  • Require MPs to publicly declare assets post-election in a Register of Interests, following Commonwealth practices (e.g., UK, Australia).
• Sovereign Wealth Funds:
  • Hold closed-door parliamentary hearings for Temasek and GIC, publish senior management salary ranges, and compare performance to global benchmarks.
• Freedom of Information:
  • Enact a Freedom of Information Act, requiring government disclosure unless exemptions (e.g., national security) are justified in court.
  • Automatically declassify documents after 25 years, unless restricted for security.
• Media Reform:
  • Liberalize the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, removing ministerial approval for management shares, and reduce online news content provider bonds ($50,000 to $20,000).
  • Establish an independent press standards committee to handle complaints and enforce journalistic integrity, funded by Parliament.
  • Fund local digital media start-ups to foster diversity, redirecting $900 million SPH Media Trust and $310 million MediaCorp grants.
• POFMA Reform:
  • Vest POFMA powers in the judiciary, limiting use to deliberate falsehood campaigns to reduce chilling effects on free speech.
• Electoral Reforms:
  • Abolish GRCs, replacing with minority NCMP schemes or a hybrid FPTP/proportional representation system with multi-racial candidate mandates.
  • Reform electoral boundary reviews with transparent processes, fixed voter counts (30,000 ±10%), and bipartisan approval for major boundary changes.
• People’s Association (PA):
  • Depoliticize PA by appointing neutral public servants as Grassroots Advisors, excluding MPs and political figures.
• Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs):
  • Mandate public EIAs for major developments, with 2-month feedback periods, evaluating biodiversity, ecosystems, and emissions.
• Voting Age:
  • Lower voting age to 18, aligning with global norms and National Service obligations.
• Parliamentary Support:
  • Create a Parliament Research Service (PRS) with seconded experts to support MPs’ policy research.
  • Form bipartisan standing committees to scrutinize legislation over 2 months, with powers to subpoena witnesses and access PRS.

Conclusion

Launched ahead of the May 3, 2025, election, the PSP’s manifesto builds on parliamentary proposals since 2020, reflecting resident feedback and critiques of PAP policies.

The party emphasizes its role in holding the government accountable, citing past PAP responses (e.g., Pioneer Generation Package) to opposition gains.

Implementation challenges include fiscal costs (e.g., GST reduction, caregiver allowances) and political resistance to reforms like GRC abolition.

The PSP’s focus on affordability, housing, and governance aligns with public concerns, but success depends on electing at least 33 opposition MPs to block constitutional amendments.

新加坡能否在动荡的地缘政治格局中保持中立？

前贸易及工业部长、现任教育部长陈振声在新传媒播客中指出，问题不在于选择站队——有时这由不得你——而在于让新加坡变得如此不可或缺，以至于各方都想分一杯羹。

陈部长的洞见凸显了新加坡务实的外交策略，但却掩盖了一个冷峻的事实：在中美之间深厚的经济与战略纠葛面前，中立不过是一场海市蜃楼。

中立承诺公正，但新加坡的现实与之背道而驰

由于与美国和中国的经济、战略及地缘政治联系根深蒂固，新加坡在中美贸易战中无法保持真正中立。

2023年，中国占新加坡出口的14%（830亿美元），进口的13%；美国则占出口的13%（760亿美元），进口的10%。

美国的外国直接投资（2340亿美元）是新加坡经济增长的引擎，而中国的“一带一路”倡议则充分利用新加坡港口的枢纽地位，2024年处理了3700万标准箱（TEU）。

新加坡支持美国主导的印太框架，如2022年启动的“印太经济繁荣框架”（IPEF）。这一由14国（不含中国）组成的联盟，旨在促进贸易与供应链韧性。

被排除在IPEF之外的中国，将其视为美国遏制其地区影响力的棋局。中国外交部长王毅痛斥这是经济“脱钩”与“煽动对抗”的企图。

2024年，中国官媒点名批评新加坡在IPEF中的角色，暗示可能招致贸易报复，至今虽未见实质行动，但信号清晰：当最大贸易伙伴感到被背叛，中立不过是镜花水月。

在东盟走钢丝：平衡大国与区域挑战

在安全领域，新加坡依赖美国，尤其是在动荡地区维持威慑力量，这使其战略天平有所倾斜。

真正的中立要求疏远与美国的防务合作，但面对区域威胁——包括中国在南海对东盟的强硬姿态——这一选项几无可能。

尽管新加坡在南海没有主权声索，但其支持基于规则的国际秩序，暗中配合美国针对中国主张的“航行自由”行动。这一立场在《2024年新加坡外交政策报告》中清晰阐述，引发中国不满，重创其中立形象。

作为东盟核心成员，新加坡致力于区域团结。然而，东盟内部裂痕——柬埔寨与老挝亲近中国，菲律宾与越南倾向美国——使中立成为外交雷区。

新加坡的真正策略：不是中立，而是实力

选择中立意味着在经济与安全上避免与任何一方结盟，但新加坡对中美市场的依赖迫使其采取务实外交。

偏向一方可能疏远另一方，而超然物外则可能使新加坡在全球贸易网络中被边缘化。

因此，新加坡追求“战略自主”——两面下注、多元化伙伴关系、保持最大灵活性。这种策略宛如一辆精密战车，游走于大国博弈之间，而不被任何一方完全吞并。

2023年，新加坡6000亿新元的经济在关税逆风中仍增长1.2%，彰显其非凡韧性。

新加坡的真正优势不在于回避站队，而在于让自己成为不可或缺的枢纽，让大国竞相拉拢。

这不是中立——这是实力。

Disclaimer: This analysis is a speculative exploration based on geopolitical trends, historical patterns, and open-source intelligence.

Foreign interference isn’t a conspiracy theory; it’s a global reality, from Russia’s 2016 U.S. election hacks to China’s whispered influence in Australia.

Singapore, a tiny island with outsized influence, is a high-value target. Its role as a global financial hub, with approximately S$5.4 trillion in assets under management makes its electoral outcome a matter of international consequence.

China

China, Singapore’s largest trading partner with S$150 billion in bilateral trade in 2022, has strong incentives to influence GE2025.

As ASEAN’s diplomatic anchor, Singapore influences regional policies critical to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and South China Sea claims.

A government aligned with Beijing would enhance its dominance in Southeast Asia, where Singapore’s neutrality is a linchpin.

Moreover, Singapore’s military training partnerships with Taiwan make it a target for China’s efforts to suppress Taiwanese independence narratives.

Past disinformation campaigns

China has a well-documented history of disinformation:

• Taiwan: Beijing has used deepfakes and propaganda to discredit Taiwanese leaders and deter voters from supporting independence, targeting Chinese-speaking communities to sow division, as reported by regional security experts.

• Philippines: China has promoted narratives portraying itself as a constructive regional actor while casting doubt on U.S. reliability, aiming to weaken U.S.-Philippine ties, per the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

• Singapore (2017): A notable incident involved Huang Jing, a U.S. citizen and academic at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, who was expelled in August 2017 for acting as an agent of influence for a foreign country, widely understood to be China. Huang used his position to share privileged information with foreign intelligence operatives and attempted to influence Singapore’s foreign policy, per MHA.

Potential impact in Singapore

Singapore’s 74% ethnic Chinese population and economic ties with China create vulnerabilities to disinformation.

AI-generated deepfakes on platforms like Meta and Tiktok could depict candidates disparaging Chinese culture, alienating voters.

Cyber operations might target journalists of alternative and mainstream media outlets, while covert funding through Chinese business networks or clan associations could support pro-China candidates.

The October 2024 deepfake video targeting former President Halimah Yacob, falsely showing her criticizing the government, underscores this threat.

The 2020 case of Dickson Yeo, a Singaporean sentenced in the U.S. for spying for Chinese intelligence, further highlights Beijing’s use of local operatives, though Yeo claimed no disloyalty to Singapore.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s diplomatic leadership in ASEAN and military ties with Taiwan make it a strategic target.

China’s ambition to dominate ASEAN relies on influencing key players like Singapore, whose neutral stance could shift regional dynamics if manipulated.

Disinformation could erode public trust or promote candidates aligned with Beijing’s goals.

Israel

Israel, a key defense partner supplying Singapore with technologies like the Iron Dome, seeks to maintain a government supportive of bilateral ties.

As one of Singapore’s few ASEAN allies alongside Thailand, and with neighbors like Malaysia and Indonesia holding anti-Israel stances, Singapore’s pro-Israel policies are crucial.

A change in government could disrupt defense cooperation or weaken Israel’s Southeast Asian foothold, where Singapore is a diplomatic and technological hub.

Past disinformation campaigns

Israel’s disinformation efforts, particularly since the Gaza war, have aimed to shape global narratives:

• U.S. Lawmakers (2024): Israel funded a $2 million campaign through Stoic, a Tel Aviv-based firm, using 600 fake social media accounts to target 128 U.S. Congresspeople with pro-Israel messaging. Active as of June 2024, it employed AI tools like ChatGPT and fake news sites to attack UNRWA and influence policy (The New York Times, June 2024).

• Gaza War propaganda: AI-driven bot farms spread false narratives to dehumanize Palestinians and pressure policymakers, as reported by The Intercept in February 2024 (Gaza: Israel, Netanyahu, propaganda, lies, Palestinians).

• Meta censorship: Israel secured the removal of 38.8 million pro-Palestinian posts on Meta platforms by April 2025, aligning with efforts to suppress criticism (Dropsite News).

• Specific falsehoods: Misleading claims, such as audio evidence in the Gaza Baptist Hospital massacre, highlight tactical disinformation (Euronews, February 2024).

Potential impact on Singapore

Israel’s cyber capabilities, exemplified by tools like Pegasus and Graphite used in Singapore pose a threat.

While the 2024 Graphite spyware from Paragon Solutions was reportedly halted, Israel’s history with Pegasus—sold to various governments—suggests that comparable tools remain active.

Disinformation campaigns might target Singapore’s Malay-Muslim community (15% of the population) to counter anti-Israel sentiments, using bots on platforms like Meta.

Covert lobbying through defense or tech partnerships could subtly influence policy.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s status as a rare ASEAN ally makes it a linchpin for Israel’s regional strategy.

A pro-Israel government ensures sustained defense cooperation and counters regional hostility.

Disinformation could protect these ties by shaping elite perceptions or neutralizing anti-Israel narratives.

Singapore's defense capabilities

Singapore has fortified its electoral process against disinformation:

• Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act 2021 (FICA): Enables authorities to remove false content and scrutinize foreign funding, countering China’s deepfakes and Israel’s bot campaigns Countering Foreign Interference.

• Cybersecurity: The Cyber Security Agency (CSA) secures electoral systems, with 2023 advisories promoting robust digital protections Advisory to Presidential Election Candidates.

• Public resilience: Media literacy campaigns and high public trust (84% in government, 2023 Edelman Trust Barometer) equip citizens to identify disinformation Commentary: What Singapore can do more against rising threat of foreign interference.

The FICA law was in the news recently when four members of one of Singapore's richest families were designated as "politically significant persons" for their membership to a China political advisory body. MHA had emphasised that the four individuals had not engaged in any “egregious activity”. As such, their designation can be seen as a pre-emptive move to guard against any potential vulnerabilities to foreign interference.

Also last year, FICA was invoked to block 95 social media accounts linked to self-exiled Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui, the first time that the account restrictions directions under FICA were being deployed.

Foreign disinformation poses a significant threat to GE2025.

China aims to dominate ASEAN by leveraging Singapore’s diplomatic influence and cultural ties, while Israel seeks to preserve its strategic alliance.

Singapore’s FICA, cybersecurity, and public resilience provide a strong defense, but sustained vigilance is critical.

Enhanced cyber audits, monitoring of foreign networks, and public education will ensure Singapore’s vote remains untainted.

As GE2025 approaches, the nation’s commitment to sovereignty will determine its success in countering these threats.

Singapore Democratic Party’s (SDP) Chee Soon Juan has made a questionable choice nominating Ariffin Sha, the 27-year-old founder of Wake Up, Singapore (WUSG), to contest Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC.

The decision is not a minor oversight—it points to a lapse in judgment that may cast doubts on Chee’s fitness for ministerial office.

While the People’s Action Party (PAP) has faced its own scandals involving individuals who were later convicted (Eg. Iswaran), these typically emerge after elections, not before.

Background

In August 2024, Ariffin was fined S$8,000 after pleading guilty to criminal defamation for publishing a fabricated story about KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital, falsely claiming a woman suffered a miscarriage due to negligence.

Chee’s response to Ariffin's red flag is has been evasive.

At a press conference on April 13, 2025, he urged voters to focus on SDP’s policies, not Ariffin’s past, and compared the case to former PAP Speaker Tan Chuan-Jin’s resignation over an extramarital affair. The comparison misses the mark: Tan’s personal lapse, while serious, did not involve lawbreaking or public harm.

Chee’s deflection sidesteps the core issue of vetting a candidate with a known conviction.

Leadership requires sound judgement

The PAP is not immune to scrutiny.

Cases like former Transport Minister S. Iswaran’s corruption charges in January 2024 and former Tampines GRC MP Cheng Li Hui’s affair with Speaker of Parliament Tan Chuan Jin reveal vetting gaps.

However, these issues emerged after elections. The PAP acted decisively, removing Iswaran from his post and asked both Tan Chuan Jin and Cheng Li Hui to resign.

No system guarantees flawless candidates, but knowingly selecting a convict pre-election reflects a clearer lapse in judgment.

Zero tolerance on misinformation

Ariffin’s case strikes at Singapore’s zero-tolerance stance on misinformation.

In 2024, POFMA was invoked 15 times to correct falsehoods, underscoring the harm of unchecked narratives. Ariffin’s defamation directly contravened this ethos, making his nomination a liability in a constituency where community cohesion is vital.

Residents value reliability in governance. Chee’s oversight suggests a disconnect, potentially eroding confidence in SDP’s ability to address bread-and-butter issues like job security and affordability.

Ariffin’s supporters may cite his work with Wake Up, Singapore, which amplifies marginalized voices, or argue his youth mitigates his error. These arguments carry limited weight.

Public office demands high standards, especially in Singapore, where trust underpins stability.

Ariffin’s conviction reflects a lapse in responsibility, and Chee’s endorsement suggests inadequate scrutiny.

2025年5月3日，Jalan Kayu单选区（Jalan Kayu SMC）的29,565名选民将站在十字路口，选择两条崎岖路径之一：人民行动党（PAP）职总秘书长黄志明，背负2024年职总英康收购案的污点，宛如一辆伤痕累累的战车；抑或红点团结党（RDU）的激进教育家卡拉·马尼卡姆，其2021年前进党诉讼风波暴露的个人主义倾向，恰似一艘独木舟在政治风浪中摇摆 [译注：2025年4月22日，红点团结党宣布退出Jalan Kayu单选区，支持工人党参选，以避免多角竞争。本文基于此前候选人假设撰写]。

候选人背景

黄志明（56岁）

黄志明曾于2009至2013年担任新加坡空军总长，2013至2015年升任三军总长，展现军事生涯的严谨与权威。2015年，他代表人民行动党当选巴西立-榜鹅集选区国会议员，但在2020年竞逐盛港集选区时，以47.88%的得票率铩羽而归。自2018年起，他担任职总秘书长，力推劳动力发展和工人权益政策，试图为职场注入活力。然而，2024年职总英康收购案令其公信力蒙尘，被舆论抨击“要么纵容利益输送，要么严重失职”，如同一座信任堡垒被风暴侵蚀。

卡拉·马尼卡姆（57岁）

卡拉·马尼卡姆是单亲母亲、特殊教育专家兼中小企业主，拥有终身教育硕士学位，散发草根魅力。她是新加坡武装部队首批女军官之一，服役七年，官至中尉，彰显坚韧。2020年，她代表前进党竞选义顺集选区，获38.76%选票；同年12月被开除，2021年提起“不当终止党籍”诉讼，后和解。此事暴露其“独行侠”作风。如今，她加入红点团结党，聚焦职业培训和生活成本压力，试图以小党之力撬动选民心弦。

黄志明的职总英康风波

2024年7月，职总与德国保险巨头英杰华（Allianz）提出22亿新元的收购案，宣称将增强职总英康的竞争力。8月，黄志明与职总主席达纳拉克希米发表联合声明，信誓旦旦保证英杰华将维护英康的社会使命。然而，细节如暗礁般浮现，险些葬送交易。英杰华计划提取18.5亿新元资本，近半投资可迅速回笼，恐耗尽维持低保费的储备金，宛如从社会保障的根基抽梁换柱。2024年10月14日，文化、社区及青年部长唐振辉代表政府果断叫停交易，认定其背离英康2022年公司化目标，即强化财务实力以惠及保单持有人。

黄志明坚称职总中央委员会对资本提取计划毫不知情，试图撇清责任，但前英康首席执行官陈瑞财痛斥该计划“违背诚信”，直指交易暗藏私利。新加坡管理大学副教授陈庆文直言，这种无知“令人瞠目结舌” [译注：意指难以置信的疏忽]，如同指挥官在战场上迷失方向。2025年1月，黄志明将就业不稳定性归咎于人工智能，回避外籍劳工政策争议，被批“高高在上”，如同一座与民意脱节的孤塔。2020年盛港集选区失利已暴露其政治软肋，选民不禁质疑：他究竟是工人代言人，还是行动党机器的忠实齿轮？

卡拉的前进党诉讼争议

2021年7月，卡拉向高等法院起诉前进党，后移交国家法院，掀起政治风波。她要求宣告2020年12月开除决定“违法无效”，并追讨1万新元竞选开支，指控前进党违宪，未给予她申辩机会。前进党提交七份宣誓书，包括党魁陈清木的证词，指控她破坏团队凝聚力、抗命不遵。同区候选人郑德源透露，她跳过团队会议、擅自组织走访，形同独奏而非合唱。17人联署反对其复职，干部以55:11的投票支持开除决定。

陈清木回忆，2020年11月会议上，卡拉“挑衅好斗”，高喊“证据呢？证据呢？”，如同一头不甘受缚的猛兽。她通过脸书和法庭公开控诉，展现原则性，却也暴露分裂倾向，宛如在政治舞台上独舞。转投红点团结党被批“机会主义”，如同一名独行侠在寻找新战场。诉讼虽和解，但卡拉的个人主义标签挥之不去，恐难适应新加坡强调协作的政治生态。

选情分析

黄志明依托行动党强大的基层网络，Jalan Kayu单选区与宏茂桥集选区的历史渊源为其加分。然而，英康风波重创公信力，盛港失利阴影犹存，选民质疑其是否真为工人发声。卡拉的草根形象贴近民心，反对党协调机制或助其整合选票，但诉讼风波暴露团队协作缺陷，红点团结党知名度有限，难以撼动主流。工人党未派候选人，人民力量党若参选可能分散反对派选票，但红点团结党与其他小党的协调或可缓解分裂风险。这场选举无关谁是耀眼的明星，而是两块“卡由”（马来语“木头”谐音，喻指不完美的候选人）中，谁能更稳固地承载选民的期望。