Fathership

Harpreet Nehal Singh met with Senior Leaders of PAP and Lee Kuan Yew between 2005 to 2006

From PAP aspirant to WP member - or mole?

|4 min read
Harpreet Nehal Singh met with Senior Leaders of PAP and Lee Kuan Yew between 2005 to 2006

Nearly two decades ago, Harpreet Nehal Singh — Harvard-educated, mentored by legal giant Davinder Singh, and bold enough to spar with Lee Kuan Yew on live television — sought entry into Singapore’s ruling elite.

Between 2005 to 2006, Harpreet met with the top brass of PAP's leadership - including multiple one-on-ones with Lee Hsien Loong, Tharman Shamugaratnam, S Jayakumar (then deputy prime minister) and the late Lee Kuan Yew.

As Jom confirms in a 2024 interview with Harpreet: “The cabinet deliberated” before rejecting him with the ambiguous, “There are different ways to contribute to this country.”

Now, at 59, Harpreet traded the establishment’s orbit for the opposition’s front line.

From PAP Aspirant to WP Member — or mole?

Harpreet's rejection didn’t end his political ambitions — he applied for an NMP role in 2007 but was again unsuccessful.

By the 2010s, Jom notes his growing disillusionment with PAP, mirrored by its declining vote share (75.3% in 2001 to 61.2% in 2020).

In 2021, he began volunteering with then - WP MP Leon Perera, and by 2023, he was seen in WP’s light blue uniform, engaging in walkabouts and Hammer newspaper sales.

The timing and context of Harpreet’s PAP meeting invite close to two decades ago invite speculation: was his rejection genuine, or a staged exit to position him as a long-term asset?

Meeting senior PAP leaders suggests trust — why entertain a high-profile candidate only to dismiss him without cause?

Harpreet is Establishment material

Harpreet’s resume screams establishment: Straits Times columns, elite circles, a career thriving in the PAP’s ecosystem.

His 2023 pivot to the WP feels dramatic—too dramatic, perhaps.

Jom quotes him decrying POFMA, Yale-NUS’s closure, and media control: “I don’t see this thing self-correcting.”

It’s a sharp but measured critique, never fully anti-establishment - almost as if he’s playing a part, staying within bounds set by unseen handlers. But it’s also rehearsed, polished — “carefully primed, bullet-proofed,” as Jom puts it.

Could Harpreet’s 2005-2006 encounter have been a directive to embed himself elsewhere, resurfacing in the WP as it gains traction ahead of the 2025 General Election?

The mole hypothesis

Here’s the theory: the PAP, masters of control, saw in Harpreet not a liability but an asset.

They let him simmer, maintaining his insider ties — think Davinder Singh’s mentorship, his establishment perch — while grooming him for a covert role.

That 2005-2006 meeting wasn’t a dead end — it was a starting line. He’s not hiding disillusionment; he’s concealing loyalty.

The WP’s growth threatens the PAP’s grip; who better to embed than a credentialed ally who can pass as a convert?

If he wins a seat, he’s not just a voice — he’s a listener, a conduit back to the ruling elite.

Jom calls him a potential “big fish” for the opposition, but what if he’s bait, dangling to keep the WP in check?

The PAP didn’t lose him — they deployed him.

Harpreet the Harpoon

Harpreet’s WP role is public: he’s been photographed with leaders like Pritam Singh and Sylvia Lim, and his March 18, 2025, Facebook post declares pride in the party, advocating “balanced politics.”

Yet, the PAP’s silence on his departure is telling — no rebuttal, no narrative.

His insider roots — mentored by Davinder Singh, a PAP stalwart — contrast with his late opposition turn at 59.

The WP’s rise (10 seats in 2020) makes it a target for monitoring; Harpreet, with his credentials, fits as a potential plant.

No hard proof exists — his 2005-2006 meeting’s details remain opaque — but the hypothesis lingers.

What’s 'Harpreet the Harpoon' burying? A directive, whispered by senior leaders, to infiltrate and report? A promise of reward if he pulls it off? He’s not the naive reformer Jom lionizes; he’s a chess piece, moved by the party he claims to oppose.

Evidence is thin, but the pattern fits: a man too connected to break free, too strategic to act on whim.

What’s next?

Harpreet’s next steps will clarify his intent.

If he contests in 2025 and wins, his parliamentary actions — loyalty to WP or subtle PAP alignment — could reveal more.

For now, his journey from a 2005-2006 PAP meeting to WP prominence is fact; whether it masks a mole’s agenda is conjecture.

The timeline holds: he met PAP leaders nearly two decades ago, was rebuffed, and now challenges them — or does he?

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PSP Tan Cheng Bock now admits that we have to worry about US tariffs

Dr Tan called PM Wong's statement on the US tariffs as a fear-mongering but later admitted that it's a very serious problem.

|2 min read
PSP Tan Cheng Bock now admits that we have to worry about US tariffs

During the PSP's manifesto launch early this month (Apr 6), Dr Tan Cheng Bock, the party's chairman, criticized the government's response to the US tariffs as "overblown".

He suggested that the government's strong warnings, such as Prime Minister Lawrence Wong's (PM Wong) statement on about the "likelihood of a full-blown global trade war," might be an attempt to "instil fear" in voters to make them choose the incumbent as a "safe bet" ahead of the General Election.

In a YouTube video, PM Wong urged Singaporeans to brace themselves because the risks are real and the stakes high.

Dr Tan called for economists to study the real impact of the tariffs. "Don't just make statements of this kind and scare everybody," he said.

To worry or not to worry?

On Saturday (Apr 19), Dr Tan reiterated his party’s stance on the trade war, calling it “a very difficult problem, but a very serious problem” that “we are not taking lightly”.

He said: "Trump is so unpredictable. I cannot give you the answer also. But i don't think that we are just lying low and say oh, nothing to worry. of course, we worry differently. We are looking for answers. This is a very difficult, serious problem. And we are not taking it lightly."

PSP's position on the US tariffs reflects a critical view of the government's initial response as potentially exaggerated for political gain but later recognized the trade war's significant economic implications that should not be taken lightly.

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新加坡无法在中美冲突中保持真正中立

在全球地缘政治的风暴中,新加坡如何驾驭大国博弈?选择中立意味着在经济与安全上避免与任何一方结盟。然而,新加坡对中美两大市场的深层依赖,迫使其采取务实外交。这不是中立性的试炼——而是实力的彰显。通过在供应链、科技与外交领域砥砺锋芒,新加坡并非规避站队,而是化被动为主动,让大国竞相争取其青睐。这不是中立——这是实力。

|1 min read
新加坡无法在中美冲突中保持真正中立

新加坡能否在动荡的地缘政治格局中保持中立?

前贸易及工业部长、现任教育部长陈振声在新传媒播客中指出,问题不在于选择站队——有时这由不得你——而在于让新加坡变得如此不可或缺,以至于各方都想分一杯羹。

陈部长的洞见凸显了新加坡务实的外交策略,但却掩盖了一个冷峻的事实:在中美之间深厚的经济与战略纠葛面前,中立不过是一场海市蜃楼。

中立承诺公正,但新加坡的现实与之背道而驰

由于与美国和中国的经济、战略及地缘政治联系根深蒂固,新加坡在中美贸易战中无法保持真正中立。

2023年,中国占新加坡出口的14%(830亿美元),进口的13%;美国则占出口的13%(760亿美元),进口的10%。

美国的外国直接投资(2340亿美元)是新加坡经济增长的引擎,而中国的“一带一路”倡议则充分利用新加坡港口的枢纽地位,2024年处理了3700万标准箱(TEU)。

新加坡支持美国主导的印太框架,如2022年启动的“印太经济繁荣框架”(IPEF)。这一由14国(不含中国)组成的联盟,旨在促进贸易与供应链韧性。

被排除在IPEF之外的中国,将其视为美国遏制其地区影响力的棋局。中国外交部长王毅痛斥这是经济“脱钩”与“煽动对抗”的企图。

2024年,中国官媒点名批评新加坡在IPEF中的角色,暗示可能招致贸易报复,至今虽未见实质行动,但信号清晰:当最大贸易伙伴感到被背叛,中立不过是镜花水月。

在东盟走钢丝:平衡大国与区域挑战

在安全领域,新加坡依赖美国,尤其是在动荡地区维持威慑力量,这使其战略天平有所倾斜。

真正的中立要求疏远与美国的防务合作,但面对区域威胁——包括中国在南海对东盟的强硬姿态——这一选项几无可能。

尽管新加坡在南海没有主权声索,但其支持基于规则的国际秩序,暗中配合美国针对中国主张的“航行自由”行动。这一立场在《2024年新加坡外交政策报告》中清晰阐述,引发中国不满,重创其中立形象。

作为东盟核心成员,新加坡致力于区域团结。然而,东盟内部裂痕——柬埔寨与老挝亲近中国,菲律宾与越南倾向美国——使中立成为外交雷区。

新加坡的真正策略:不是中立,而是实力

选择中立意味着在经济与安全上避免与任何一方结盟,但新加坡对中美市场的依赖迫使其采取务实外交。

偏向一方可能疏远另一方,而超然物外则可能使新加坡在全球贸易网络中被边缘化。

因此,新加坡追求“战略自主”——两面下注、多元化伙伴关系、保持最大灵活性。这种策略宛如一辆精密战车,游走于大国博弈之间,而不被任何一方完全吞并。

2023年,新加坡6000亿新元的经济在关税逆风中仍增长1.2%,彰显其非凡韧性。

新加坡的真正优势不在于回避站队,而在于让自己成为不可或缺的枢纽,让大国竞相拉拢。

这不是中立——这是实力。

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China, Israel's foreign agents may conduct disinformation campaigns for S'pore's GE2025

China aims to dominate ASEAN by leveraging Singapore’s diplomatic influence and cultural ties, while Israel seeks to preserve its strategic alliance with Singapore - one of very few countries still allied with Israel in ASEAN.

|6 min read
China, Israel's foreign agents may conduct disinformation campaigns for S'pore's GE2025

Disclaimer: This analysis is a speculative exploration based on geopolitical trends, historical patterns, and open-source intelligence.


Foreign interference isn’t a conspiracy theory; it’s a global reality, from Russia’s 2016 U.S. election hacks to China’s whispered influence in Australia.

Singapore, a tiny island with outsized influence, is a high-value target. Its role as a global financial hub, with approximately S$5.4 trillion in assets under management makes its electoral outcome a matter of international consequence.

China

China, Singapore’s largest trading partner with S$150 billion in bilateral trade in 2022, has strong incentives to influence GE2025.

As ASEAN’s diplomatic anchor, Singapore influences regional policies critical to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and South China Sea claims.

A government aligned with Beijing would enhance its dominance in Southeast Asia, where Singapore’s neutrality is a linchpin.

Moreover, Singapore’s military training partnerships with Taiwan make it a target for China’s efforts to suppress Taiwanese independence narratives.

Past disinformation campaigns

China has a well-documented history of disinformation:

  • Taiwan: Beijing has used deepfakes and propaganda to discredit Taiwanese leaders and deter voters from supporting independence, targeting Chinese-speaking communities to sow division, as reported by regional security experts.

  • Philippines: China has promoted narratives portraying itself as a constructive regional actor while casting doubt on U.S. reliability, aiming to weaken U.S.-Philippine ties, per the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

  • Singapore (2017): A notable incident involved Huang Jing, a U.S. citizen and academic at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, who was expelled in August 2017 for acting as an agent of influence for a foreign country, widely understood to be China. Huang used his position to share privileged information with foreign intelligence operatives and attempted to influence Singapore’s foreign policy, per MHA.

Potential impact in Singapore

Singapore’s 74% ethnic Chinese population and economic ties with China create vulnerabilities to disinformation.

AI-generated deepfakes on platforms like Meta and Tiktok could depict candidates disparaging Chinese culture, alienating voters.

Cyber operations might target journalists of alternative and mainstream media outlets, while covert funding through Chinese business networks or clan associations could support pro-China candidates.

The October 2024 deepfake video targeting former President Halimah Yacob, falsely showing her criticizing the government, underscores this threat.

The 2020 case of Dickson Yeo, a Singaporean sentenced in the U.S. for spying for Chinese intelligence, further highlights Beijing’s use of local operatives, though Yeo claimed no disloyalty to Singapore.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s diplomatic leadership in ASEAN and military ties with Taiwan make it a strategic target.

China’s ambition to dominate ASEAN relies on influencing key players like Singapore, whose neutral stance could shift regional dynamics if manipulated.

Disinformation could erode public trust or promote candidates aligned with Beijing’s goals.

Israel

Israel, a key defense partner supplying Singapore with technologies like the Iron Dome, seeks to maintain a government supportive of bilateral ties.

As one of Singapore’s few ASEAN allies alongside Thailand, and with neighbors like Malaysia and Indonesia holding anti-Israel stances, Singapore’s pro-Israel policies are crucial.

A change in government could disrupt defense cooperation or weaken Israel’s Southeast Asian foothold, where Singapore is a diplomatic and technological hub.

Past disinformation campaigns

Israel’s disinformation efforts, particularly since the Gaza war, have aimed to shape global narratives:

  • U.S. Lawmakers (2024): Israel funded a $2 million campaign through Stoic, a Tel Aviv-based firm, using 600 fake social media accounts to target 128 U.S. Congresspeople with pro-Israel messaging. Active as of June 2024, it employed AI tools like ChatGPT and fake news sites to attack UNRWA and influence policy (The New York Times, June 2024).

  • Gaza War propaganda: AI-driven bot farms spread false narratives to dehumanize Palestinians and pressure policymakers, as reported by The Intercept in February 2024 (Gaza: Israel, Netanyahu, propaganda, lies, Palestinians).

  • Meta censorship: Israel secured the removal of 38.8 million pro-Palestinian posts on Meta platforms by April 2025, aligning with efforts to suppress criticism (Dropsite News).

  • Specific falsehoods: Misleading claims, such as audio evidence in the Gaza Baptist Hospital massacre, highlight tactical disinformation (Euronews, February 2024).

Potential impact on Singapore

Israel’s cyber capabilities, exemplified by tools like Pegasus and Graphite used in Singapore pose a threat.

While the 2024 Graphite spyware from Paragon Solutions was reportedly halted, Israel’s history with Pegasus—sold to various governments—suggests that comparable tools remain active.

Disinformation campaigns might target Singapore’s Malay-Muslim community (15% of the population) to counter anti-Israel sentiments, using bots on platforms like Meta.

Covert lobbying through defense or tech partnerships could subtly influence policy.

Why Singapore?

Singapore’s status as a rare ASEAN ally makes it a linchpin for Israel’s regional strategy.

A pro-Israel government ensures sustained defense cooperation and counters regional hostility.

Disinformation could protect these ties by shaping elite perceptions or neutralizing anti-Israel narratives.

Singapore's defense capabilities

Singapore has fortified its electoral process against disinformation:

The FICA law was in the news recently when four members of one of Singapore's richest families were designated as "politically significant persons" for their membership to a China political advisory body. MHA had emphasised that the four individuals had not engaged in any “egregious activity”. As such, their designation can be seen as a pre-emptive move to guard against any potential vulnerabilities to foreign interference.

Also last year, FICA was invoked to block 95 social media accounts linked to self-exiled Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui, the first time that the account restrictions directions under FICA were being deployed.

Foreign disinformation poses a significant threat to GE2025.

China aims to dominate ASEAN by leveraging Singapore’s diplomatic influence and cultural ties, while Israel seeks to preserve its strategic alliance.

Singapore’s FICA, cybersecurity, and public resilience provide a strong defense, but sustained vigilance is critical.

Enhanced cyber audits, monitoring of foreign networks, and public education will ensure Singapore’s vote remains untainted.

As GE2025 approaches, the nation’s commitment to sovereignty will determine its success in countering these threats.

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Chee Soon Juan's choice of Ariffin Sha raises questions on vetting

No system guarantees flawless candidates, but knowingly selecting a convict pre-election reflects a clearer lapse in judgment.

|2 min read
Chee Soon Juan's choice of Ariffin Sha raises questions on vetting

Singapore Democratic Party’s (SDP) Chee Soon Juan has made a questionable choice nominating Ariffin Sha, the 27-year-old founder of Wake Up, Singapore (WUSG), to contest Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC.

The decision is not a minor oversight—it points to a lapse in judgment that may cast doubts on Chee’s fitness for ministerial office.

While the People’s Action Party (PAP) has faced its own scandals involving individuals who were later convicted (Eg. Iswaran), these typically emerge after elections, not before.

Background

In August 2024, Ariffin was fined S$8,000 after pleading guilty to criminal defamation for publishing a fabricated story about KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital, falsely claiming a woman suffered a miscarriage due to negligence.

Chee’s response to Ariffin's red flag is has been evasive.

At a press conference on April 13, 2025, he urged voters to focus on SDP’s policies, not Ariffin’s past, and compared the case to former PAP Speaker Tan Chuan-Jin’s resignation over an extramarital affair. The comparison misses the mark: Tan’s personal lapse, while serious, did not involve lawbreaking or public harm.

Chee’s deflection sidesteps the core issue of vetting a candidate with a known conviction.

Leadership requires sound judgement

The PAP is not immune to scrutiny.

Cases like former Transport Minister S. Iswaran’s corruption charges in January 2024 and former Tampines GRC MP Cheng Li Hui’s affair with Speaker of Parliament Tan Chuan Jin reveal vetting gaps.

However, these issues emerged after elections. The PAP acted decisively, removing Iswaran from his post and asked both Tan Chuan Jin and Cheng Li Hui to resign.

No system guarantees flawless candidates, but knowingly selecting a convict pre-election reflects a clearer lapse in judgment.

Zero tolerance on misinformation

Ariffin’s case strikes at Singapore’s zero-tolerance stance on misinformation.

In 2024, POFMA was invoked 15 times to correct falsehoods, underscoring the harm of unchecked narratives. Ariffin’s defamation directly contravened this ethos, making his nomination a liability in a constituency where community cohesion is vital.

Residents value reliability in governance. Chee’s oversight suggests a disconnect, potentially eroding confidence in SDP’s ability to address bread-and-butter issues like job security and affordability.

Ariffin’s supporters may cite his work with Wake Up, Singapore, which amplifies marginalized voices, or argue his youth mitigates his error. These arguments carry limited weight.

Public office demands high standards, especially in Singapore, where trust underpins stability.

Ariffin’s conviction reflects a lapse in responsibility, and Chee’s endorsement suggests inadequate scrutiny.

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GE2025 - Here are the key points from SDP's manifesto

The manifesto focuses on reducing economic inequality, enhancing social welfare, reforming education, and strengthening democratic governance.

|7 min read
GE2025 - Here are the key points from SDP's manifesto

The Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) released its manifesto for Singapore's 2025 General Election under the slogan “Thrive, Not Just Survive,” presenting a comprehensive set of policy proposals to address key national issues.

1. Cost of Living

The SDP highlights Singapore’s rising cost of living, driven by high housing prices, healthcare costs, and regressive taxation like the Goods and Services Tax (GST). The party critiques policies that burden the middle and lower classes while wealth concentrates among the elite.

  • Tax Reforms:
    • Abolish GST on essential items (e.g., food, medicine, school supplies) to reduce costs of necessities. No specific list of items or fiscal impact estimate is provided.
    • Increase income tax on the top 1% of earners to fund social programs. No tax rate or revenue target is specified.
    • Reinstate estate duty to address wealth inequality. No thresholds, rates, or expected revenue are detailed.
  • Ministerial Salary Reduction:
    • Cut ministerial salaries significantly, redirecting savings to aid lower-income households. No specific reduction amount or savings estimate is provided (current ministerial salaries: ~S$1.1M–S$3.2M annually, 2022 data).
  • Minimum Wage:
    • Introduce a minimum wage to ensure a living wage. No specific wage amount (e.g., S$2,000/month) or implementation timeline is stated.
  • Economic Transparency:
    • Enhance transparency in managing national reserves to ensure equitable use. No mechanisms (e.g., audits, parliamentary oversight) or reserve figures are specified.
Policy AreaKey ProposalIntended Impact
TaxationAbolish GST on essentials, tax top 1%, reinstate estate dutyReduce regressive tax burden, fund social programs
SalariesCut ministerial salariesRedirect funds to aid the poor
WagesIntroduce minimum wageEnsure dignified living standards
ReservesIncrease transparencyPromote equitable use of public funds

2. Housing

The SDP criticizes the high cost of Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats, driven by land costs and the 99-year lease decay issue. The party proposes restructuring the housing system to prioritize affordability and sustainability.

  • Non-Open Market (NOM) Scheme:
    • Cap HDB flat prices at S$270,000, excluding land costs, with flats sold back to HDB upon resale to maintain affordability. No details on flat types (e.g., 3-room, 4-room) or locations covered are provided (2024 BTO prices: ~S$300,000–S$600,000).
  • Voluntary En-bloc Redevelopment Scheme (VERS):
    • Introduce a sustainable VERS to address lease decay, enabling collective redevelopment. No specifics on funding, scale, or eligible estates are mentioned.
  • Increase Housing Supply:
    • Build more affordable flats to meet demand, reducing waiting times and prices. No specific figure for annual flat supply (e.g., 20,000 flats/year, as in 2024 HDB data) or demand metrics (e.g., marriage rates) is provided.
Policy AreaKey ProposalIntended Impact
NOM SchemeCap HDB flats at S$270,000, exclude land costsMake housing affordable, curb speculation
VERSSustainable en-bloc redevelopmentAddress lease decay, maintain affordability
SupplyBuild more flatsReduce waiting times, stabilize prices

3. Jobs and Wages

The SDP aims to prioritize Singaporeans in employment, reduce reliance on foreign labor, and address wage stagnation, particularly for Professionals, Managers, Executives, and Technicians (PMETs), in a workforce where foreign workers comprise ~39% (2024 data).

  • Minimum Wage:
    • Implement a minimum wage to ensure a living wage. No specific amount or benchmark (e.g., S$2,000/month) is provided.
  • Talent Track Scheme:
    • Introduce a points-based system for foreign PMETs, prioritizing Singaporeans for hiring and retrenchment protection. No criteria (e.g., skills, experience) or quotas are specified.
  • Foreign Labor Reduction:
    • Gradually reduce reliance on foreign workers to create opportunities for Singaporeans. No target percentage (e.g., from 39% to 30%) or timeline is stated.
  • CPF Minimum Sum Reform:
    • Eliminate the CPF Minimum Sum Scheme (Full Retirement Sum: ~S$213,000, 2024) to provide retirement flexibility. No alternative savings mechanism is proposed.
Policy AreaKey ProposalIntended Impact
WagesMinimum wageEnsure fair compensation
EmploymentTalent Track Scheme, prioritize SingaporeansProtect local job opportunities
Foreign LaborReduce relianceIncrease jobs for Singaporeans
CPFScrap Minimum Sum SchemeEnhance retirement flexibility

4. Social Safety Net

The SDP seeks to strengthen social support, focusing on healthcare, marginalized communities, and gender equality, replacing complex schemes with accessible programs.

  • National Health Investment Fund (NHIF):
    • Replace the 3M system (Medisave, Medishield, Medifund) with NHIF, where citizens contribute a fixed monthly amount, and the government funds the rest via taxes. No contribution amount (e.g., S$50/month) or total cost estimate is provided.
    • Make maternal and pediatric care mostly free. No scope (e.g., age limit for pediatric care) or budget is specified.
  • Malay Community Upliftment:
    • Implement a 10-point plan to address economic inequality, education access, and discrimination. No specific actions (e.g., scholarship funding, employment quotas) or metrics are detailed.
  • Gender Equality:
    • Promote women’s rights via the SDP Women’s Wing, focusing on healthcare, work-life balance, and anti-discrimination. No specific programs (e.g., subsidies, leave policies) or funding is outlined.
Policy AreaKey ProposalIntended Impact
HealthcareNHIF, free maternal/pediatric careReduce medical costs, support families
Malay Community10-point upliftment planAddress inequality, promote inclusion
Gender EqualityWomen’s Wing initiativesEnhance women’s rights, work-life balance

5. Education

The SDP critiques Singapore’s exam-driven education system for fostering stress and inequality, proposing reforms to prioritize holistic development.

  • Abolish PSLE:
    • Eliminate the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) to reduce student stress. No replacement assessment (e.g., portfolios) or transition plan is detailed.
  • Smaller Class Sizes:
    • Reduce class sizes to improve learning. No target size (e.g., from 33.6 to 25 for primary, 2023 data) or funding estimate is provided.
  • Holistic Curriculum:
    • Emphasize critical thinking, creativity, and socio-emotional skills. No specific curriculum changes or teacher training plans are outlined.
  • Equal Opportunities:
    • Address socio-economic disparities in education. No interventions (e.g., subsidies) or disparity metrics (e.g., low-income student percentage) are specified.
Policy AreaKey ProposalIntended Impact
PSLEAbolish PSLEReduce exam stress, promote holistic growth
Class SizesSmaller classesEnhance personalized learning
CurriculumFocus on critical thinking, creativityPrepare students for diverse futures
EquityAddress disparitiesEnsure equal educational opportunities

6. Governance

The SDP addresses concerns over the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) dominance and restrictions on freedom of expression, seeking to enhance transparency and civil liberties.

  • Ministerial Salaries:
    • Reduce ministerial salaries to align with public service ethos. No specific reduction amount is provided.
  • Freedom of Speech:
    • Reform laws like the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) to protect constitutional rights. No specific mechanisms (e.g., judicial oversight) are detailed.
  • Constitutional Reforms:
    • Strengthen civil liberties through constitutional amendments. No specific articles or amendments are specified.
  • Government-Linked Companies (GLCs):
    • Divest inefficient GLCs to foster competition. No list of targeted GLCs or economic impact estimates is provided.
  • Regional Democratic Partnerships:
    • Foster partnerships with democratic neighbors (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia). No specific agreements or initiatives are outlined.
Policy AreaKey ProposalIntended Impact
SalariesReduce ministerial salariesPromote public service ethos
Free SpeechReform POFMA, protect rightsEnhance democratic expression
ConstitutionStrengthen civil libertiesFoster open society
GLCsDivest inefficient GLCsPromote market competition
Regional TiesDemocratic partnershipsStrengthen regional democratic values

7. Environment

The SDP emphasizes environmental sustainability, addressing climate change and resource management in a densely populated nation.

  • Climate Commitments:
    • Strengthen adherence to the Paris Agreement through emissions targets and renewable energy. No specific targets (e.g., 50% emissions cut by 2030) are provided.
  • Electric Vehicles (EVs):
    • Provide incentives for EV adoption to reduce emissions. No details on subsidies (e.g., amount per vehicle) or infrastructure (e.g., charging stations) are included.
  • Population Control:
    • Oppose population growth to 10 million, rejecting long-term planning scenarios (e.g., 2013 White Paper). No alternative population cap (e.g., 6M) is proposed.
  • Haze Pollution:
    • Enforce the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act. No specific actions (e.g., fines, regional agreements) are detailed.
  • Waste Reduction:
    • Reduce single-use packaging. No targets (e.g., 50% reduction by 2030) or mechanisms (e.g., bans) are specified.
Policy AreaKey ProposalIntended Impact
ClimateStrengthen Paris Agreement commitmentsReduce carbon footprint
EVsIncentivize EV adoptionLower transportation emissions
PopulationOppose 10 million targetEnsure sustainable growth
HazeEnforce Transboundary Haze ActAddress regional pollution
WasteReduce single-use packagingMinimize environmental impact

Conclusion

Launched ahead of the May 3, 2025, General Election, the SDP’s manifesto reflects its social liberal democratic vision, emphasizing affordability, equity, and sustainability.

Key proposals, such as the S$270,000 HDB price cap and opposition to a 10 million population, include specific figures, but most policies (e.g., building more flats, minimum wage, class size reductions) lack quantitative details, such as numerical targets or cost estimates.

Implementation challenges include fiscal costs (e.g., NHIF, GST exemptions), political resistance to bold reforms (e.g., PSLE abolition, GLC divestment), and the SDP’s limited electoral success (no seats since 1997).